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ABSTRACT
In peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing systems, many autonomous peers without
preexisting trust relationships share files with each other. Due to their open environ-
ment and distributed structure, these systems are vulnerable to the significant impact
from selfish and misbehaving nodes. Free-riding, whitewash, collusion and Sybil at-
tacks are common and serious threats, which severely harm non-malicious users and
degrade the system performance. Many trust systems were proposed for P2P file
sharing systems to encourage cooperative behaviors and punish non-cooperative be-
haviors. However, querying reputation values usually generates latency and overhead
for every user. To address this problem, a social network based trust system (i.e.,
SocialTrust) was proposed that enables nodes to first request files from friends with-
out reputation value querying since social friends are trustable, and then use trust
systems upon friend querying failure when a node’s friends do not have its queried
file. However, trust systems and SocialTrust cannot effectively deal with free-riding,
whitewash, collusion and Sybil attacks.
To handle these problems, in this thesis, we introduce a novel trust system,
called SocialLink, for P2P file sharing systems. By enabling nodes to maintain per-
sonal social network with trustworthy friends, SocialLink encourages nodes to directly
share files between friends without querying reputations and hence reduces reputa-
tion querying cost. To guarantee the quality of service (QoS) of file provisions from
ii
non-friends, SocialLink establishes directionally weighted links from the server to the
client with successful file transaction history to constitute a “weighted transaction
network”, in which the link weight is the size of the transferred file. In this way, So-
cialLink prevents potential fraudulent transactions (i.e., low-QoS file provision) and
encourages nodes to contribute files to non-friends. By constraining the connections
between malicious nodes and non-malicious nodes in the weighted transaction net-
work, SocialLink mitigates the adverse effect from whitewash, collusion and Sybil
attacks. By simulating experiments, we demonstrate that SocialLink efficiently saves
querying cost, reduces free-riding, and prevents damage from whitewash, collusion
and Sybil attacks.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing systems, many autonomous peers without
preexisting trust relationships share files with each other. Due to their open envi-
ronment and distributed structure, these systems are vulnerable to the significant
impact from selfish and misbehaving nodes. In this thesis, we propose SocialLink,
which combines online social network (OSN) and a novel weighted transaction net-
work to encourage node cooperative behaviors in P2P file sharing systems. SocialLink
is not only effective in reputation cost reduction, but also is better than existing trust
systems in malicious behavior prevention. This chapter briefly introduces the back-
ground, motivations, and general design and characteristics of SocialLink.
1.1 Background and Motivations
File sharing systems are platforms that allow users to share digital information,
such as computer programs, images, music, videos and documents. Two structures
of file sharing systems are widely applied: centralized and distributed. As shown in
Figure 1.1a and 1.1b [2], these two kinds of structures have their own characteristics.
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A centralized network has server(s) that control the whole network; all file
requests are sent to the server(s) and are replied to by the server(s) only. In this case,
file resources are limited due to the restricted processing ability and storage space of
the central server(s) in a large network. Nonetheless, a centralized network provides
a manageable environment under central control. On the contrary, in a distributed
network (e.g., P2P network), file resources are shared between peers directly. In
general, peers are users, sometimes termed as “nodes”. File requests of a node are
broadcast in the network, and are directly replied to by nodes that have the requested
files. P2P networks became very popular in many applications because requests are
disposed of speedily and file resources are extremely abundant with unlimited and
scalable providers. P2P networks enable the sharing of globally scattered computer
resources, allowing them to be collectively used in a cooperative manner for different
applications such as file sharing [3, 4], instant messages [5], audio conferences, and
distributed computing.
(a) Centralized network (b) Distributed network
Figure 1.1: Two structures for file sharing systems.
However, because of the open nature of the distributed environment, selfish
and malicious users survive easily in P2P file sharing systems. Node cooperation is
critical to achieving reliable P2P performance but proves challenging since networks
feature autonomous nodes without preexisting trust relationships. Additionally, some
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internal nodes may be compromised to be misbehaving, selfish, or even malicious.
Selfish users behave inactively in providing files, but still would like other users to
reply with their requests. This behavior is also known as “free-riding” [6]. Malicious
users can distribute corrupted files or files containing a virus into the system, which
could be further spread by non-malicious users. For example, 85% of Gnutella users
are selfish users sharing no files, and 45% of files downloaded through the Kazaa
file sharing application contained malicious code [7, 8]. Therefore, quality of service
(QoS) in file provision (i.e., transactions) is not guaranteed without any supervisory
system, and incentives are strongly required to encourage cooperative behaviors in
P2P file sharing systems.
Trust (or reputation) systems, as a cooperation incentive method for P2P file
sharing systems, have been widely studied in recent years [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. As
implemented in online market places (i.e., eBay [16], Amazon [17] and Overstock [18]),
trust systems compute and publish global reputation values (i.e., trust values) for each
user based on a collection of local ratings from others in order to provide guidance
in selecting trustworthy users. In a trust system, a user’s reputation is built based
on a collection of feedback from other users. The value of reputation is updated
based on user behavior, which means a user’s reputation value increases if it behaves
cooperatively and decreases if its behavior is selfish or malicious. When a node chooses
a server from a number of options, it queries the trust system about the reputation
value of each server and chooses the one with the highest reputation. As a result,
selfish or malicious users rapidly lose reputation and are isolated from the network
finally. Trust systems thwart the intentions of uncooperative and dishonest users
and provide incentives for high QoS transactions. To be effective in achieving this
objective, a trust system should meet the following requirements [19]:
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1. Security. Due to decentralized management of trust relationships, the trust
rating of a peer is stored at other peers in the network; it is critical that these
trust hosting peers are protected from targeted attacks.
2. Reliability. It is important that a node querying for a trust value receives the
true value despite the presence of various malicious users.
3. Accountability. In node rating based trust systems, it is important that nodes
are accountable for the feedback they provide about other nodes. Any malicious
nodes trying to manipulate trust ratings should be identifiable.
The accounts in P2P file sharing systems are often free to create (usually only
a form and a CAPTCHA [20] are required). Therefore, a group of malicious users or
one malicious user with several faked accounts can boost their reputations purposely
by taking advantage of the trust systems. The feedback-based reputation values can
be manipulated by the behaviors below [21]:
• Whitewash [22]: Malicious users with low reputation values can clear their poor
history by creating new accounts.
• Collusion [23]: A group of malicious users collude to gain high reputation values
by providing positive feedback to each other.
• Sybil attack [24]: One malicious user can create many fake accounts, known as
Sybils, and use them to forge activities and gain high reputation values with
positive feedback deliberately.
Such reputation manipulation makes it difficult to identify and isolate ma-
licious users in a P2P file sharing system. In existing trust systems, a pre-defined
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reputation threshold is used to determine users’ trustworthiness. If a node’s reputa-
tion value is lower than the threshold, it is regarded as a selfish node and will not be
chosen as a server and eventually isolated from the system. However, a clever user
can survive in the system by maintaining its reputation just above the threshold. For
example, a user can be cooperative for a period of time until it obtains a reputation
value that is higher than the threshold. Then, the user starts to provide low-quality
services. As long as the user’s reputation value is higher than the threshold, it is
considered as a reputed user, yet it can be occasionally uncooperative or even mali-
cious. At a result, existing trust systems fail to meet the requirements of reliability
and accountability. Another problem of trust systems is that the reputation querying
usually generates a certain overhead and service delay in a large-scale P2P network,
which degrades the efficiency performance of file sharing.
To avoid the reputation querying, a social network based trust system, called
SocialTrust [1], was proposed recently. Online social networks (OSNs) (i.e., Face-
book [25], Twitter [26]) connect friends in the network. By leveraging the social
property of ”friendship fosters cooperation” [27], SocialTrust enables nodes to first
query files from friends in the social network without reputation querying since social
friends are trustable, and then use trust systems upon friend querying failure. Natu-
rally, the ideas of SocialTrust can reduce the reputation querying cost. Yet, the social
network of a user usually only contains a very small part of the entire P2P file sharing
system, and a client may not be able to find a server from its friends. Thus, nodes
cannot always avoid reputation querying. By replying on trust system after friend
querying failure, SocialTrust also cannot effectively deal with free-riding, whitewash,
collusion and Sybil attacks.
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1.2 Proposed Trust System – SocialLink
Considering the shortcomings of existing trust systems and OSN-based So-
cialTrust, we propose SocialLink, a social network based trust system. It is based on
SocialTrust and enables nodes to query reliable files from non-friends, which helps
achieve the objective of widely and freely sharing files between individuals in the P2P
file sharing systems. Also, SocialLink prevents free-riding, whitewash, collusion and
Sybil attacks to a certain extent.
Like SocialTrust, SocialLink allows each user to maintain an online social
network of reliable users. Such a social network contains a list of friends who are real
world friends (i.e., family members, friends, co-workers) and frequently interacted
nodes (i.e., e-friends). For example, when node A joins a P2P file sharing system, it
can only add users it knows from the real world since it does not have any transactions
yet. After successfully exchanging a certain number of files with node B, the system
sends request to both A and B to ask whether they want to add each other to
their friend-list. By confirming the requests, A and B become online friends. Based
on the social network of a user, when given a number of server options, the user
chooses a server from his/her friend-list, if available, without querying the reputation
value. By doing this, reputation querying cost and service delay are reduced in a P2P
file sharing system. Social networks encourage users to be continuously cooperative
because familiar people do not want to damage their real-life reputations, and users
are willing to be online friends in order to receive more file resources, while saving
reputation querying cost.
In addition to maintaining the public reputation value for every user, So-
cialLink generates and maintains a “weighted transaction network”. In this network,
a link is built from node A to node B if A has successfully provided a file to B, and the
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weight of the link is the size of the files. The weight is updated based on subsequent
successful transactions between them. The weighted transaction network is used to
predict whether future transactions are fraudulent and the client is free-rider. If a
client and an identified server are connected with one link or many links, available-
flow is defined as the smallest link weight value through the links from the server to
the client, and the download-flow is defined as the smallest link weight value through
the links from the client to the server. When available servers for a client are not
one of its friends, SocialLink computes available-flow and download-flow between the
client and the servers. If the available-flow or download-flow is smaller than requested
file size, then the transactions is marked as suspicious by SocialLink. Otherwise, So-
cialLink allows transactions to be conducted, and then establishes a directional link
with a weight that equals the accumulated transferred file size from the server to the
client. The size of files that a node has contributed to other nodes determines the size
of files it can receive from them, and also determines the size of files it can provide to
others in the future. SocialLink requires that the available-flow and download-flow
must be larger than the requested file size in order to prevent malware dissemination
from malicious servers and prevent free-riding. Transactions between friends are un-
limited in size since users in the friend-list are regarded as trustable servers, which
means suspicious transaction checking queries only happen when requested files are
found outside a node’s social network.
Based on the directional weighted links between non-friends built according to
successful transactions between them, SocialLink enables nodes to share file resources
with non-friends through these links. With the weighted transaction network, So-
cialLink also deters common threats (including free-riding, whitewash, collusion and
Sybil attacks) to P2P file sharing systems. The weight transaction network is con-
structed based on successful transactions, so it is meaningless for a node to whitewash.
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Even if a malicious node creates a new account in the system to clean its bad his-
tory, the new account also has no out-going links with other nodes in the weighted
transaction network. The node must provide files to others to build out-going links
with others in order to receive files. Hence, whitewash does not help a node re-
ceive files without contributing files. The weighted transaction network also prevents
free-riding because a node must provide a certain amount of file size in order to
receive a file with corresponding size. Though malicious nodes can boost their repu-
tations through collusion and Sybil attacks, their connections with non-friends in the
weighted transaction network are still based on actual transactions. The available-
flow, download-flow and the directions of links restrict the size of files that colluder
and Sybils can download from non-friends.
In summary, the major characteristics of SocialLink are summarized as the
following:
• First, SocialLink saves querying cost by allowing friends to conduct transactions
without reputation querying.
• Second, SocialLink efficiently prevents free-riding, whitewash, collusion and
Sybil attacks, which cannot be handled in normal trust systems and previous
OSN-based trust systems.
• Third, SocialLink essentially expands the tit-for-tat strategy [28] to nodes that
do not have direct transactions, while still effectively encouraging nodes to pro-
vide files to receive files from others.
It is worth noting that in addition to P2P network applications (e.g., online file
sharing [4]), SocialLink can also be applied to other environments and applications
where a trust system is needed, such as routing in mobile ad hoc networks [29], online
market places (e.g., eBay [16] and Amazon [17]).
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1.3 Structure of this Thesis
This chapter describes the background and motivations of this thesis, and also
an overview of SocialLink. Chapter 2 introduces related work in this area. The sys-
tem design and structure of SocialLink are explained in chapter 3 in detail. Chapter 4
presents the simulation evaluation of SocialLink in comparison with other trust sys-
tems. Chapter 5 summarizes this thesis and discusses how to improve SocialLink in
the future.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
We classify the related work in trust systems to four categories: reputation
management systems, social networks based systems, attack-defense systems, and
recommendation systems.
Previously, numerous research works have been conducted on reputation man-
agement systems [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] in P2P networks. These works focus on
how to aggregate reputation ratings and calculate the reputation efficiently and ac-
curately. There are also a number of works that leverage OSNs for reliable services
in P2P networks [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35] based on the property of “friendship fosters
cooperation” [27]. Since malicious attacks are quite common in P2P file sharing sys-
tems, some research works [36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 21, 1] focus on preventing or limiting
attack edges between nodes. Recommendation systems [41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47]
are quite similar with reputation management systems in recommending servers or
objects to other nodes in P2P networks. The following sections present the related
work in each category.
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2.1 Reputation Management Systems
EigenTrust [9] minimizes the influence of malicious nodes in a P2P network.
Specifically, the global reputation of a node in the system is calculated with the
left principal eigenvector of a matrix of normalized local reputation values. Mean-
while, the entire system’s history with every node is considered to calculate reputation
value. Due to the fact that all nodes in the network compute global reputation values
symmetrically, EigenTrust is able to operate node computations in a scalable and
distributed way with minimal overhead.
PeerTrust [10] is a dynamic P2P reputation management system that quanti-
fies and evaluates the trust of nodes in P2P e-commerce communities. In this system,
five important factors are considered to evaluate the trust of a node: the feedback, the
feedback scoop, the credibility of the feedback source, the transaction context factor,
and the community context factor. A general trust metric combines these five factors,
and the metric meaningfully decreases common threats, such as man-in-the-middle
attacks, compromised nodes, and the distribution of tampered-with information in a
decentralized P2P environment.
PowerTrust [11] is a robust and scalable P2P reputation management system
that uses a trust overlay network (TON) to model the trust relationships among
nodes. The authors first examined eBay transaction data from over 10,000 users and
discovered a power-law distribution in user feedback. Their mathematical analysis
justified that a power-law distribution effectively models any dynamically growing
P2P feedback-based system, whether structured or unstructured. The authors then
developed the PowerTrust system to leverage the power-law feedback characteristics of
P2P networks. PowerTrust dynamically selects a small number of the most reputable
nodes as determined by a distributed ranking mechanism; these nodes are termed as
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“power nodes”. Using a look-ahead random walk strategy and leveraging power nodes,
PowerTrust significantly improves previous systems with respect to global reputation
accuracy and aggregation speed. PowerTrust is adaptable to highly dynamic networks
and robust to disturbances by malicious nodes.
Zhang et. al [12] found three problems in previous trust systems: (1) a binary
QoS differentiation method that classifies a service as either good or bad without any
interim state, thus limiting the potential for use by P2P networks in which servers have
diverse capabilities and clients have various QoS demands; (2) no strong incentives
designed to stimulate honest participation in the trust system; and (3) failure to
protect the privacy of references, which is important for obtaining honest feedback. To
address these problems, the authors proposed a fine-grained trust system to support
reliable service selection in P2P networks.
GossipTrust [13] is a scalable, robust, and secure reputation management sys-
tem specifically designed for unstructured P2P networks. This system leverages a
gossip-based protocol to aggregate global reputation scores; each peer randomly con-
tacts others and exchanges reputation data periodically. Gossip-based protocols do
not require any error recovery mechanism and thus enjoy simplicity and moderate
overhead compared with optimal deterministic protocols [48] such as the construc-
tion of data dissemination trees. GossipTrust is built on a fast reputation aggregation
module with enhanced security support that strengthens the robustness of the gos-
sip protocol under disturbances from malicious nodes. The system has a novel data
management scheme to answer reputation queries and to store reputation data with
low overhead. Identity-based cryptography is applied to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity of the exchanged reputation data without using certified
public keys or pre-shared secret keys.
Later on, an improved GossipTrust [14] was proposed to enable nodes to com-
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pute global reputation scores in a fully distributed, secure, scalable, and robust fash-
ion. The system can also tolerate link failures and node collusion. The technical
innovations of this improved trust system include fast gossip-based reputation ag-
gregation algorithms with small aggregation error, efficient reputation storage using
bloom filters with low false-positive error, limited network traffic overhead in gossip
message spreading, and combating peer collusion by using power nodes dynamically.
BP-P2P [15] is a Belief Propagation (BP)-based distributed reputation man-
agement system for P2P networks. Belief Propagation is an approach for calculating
marginal distributions of the unobserved nodes conditioned on the observed ones,
which has been wildly applied in many applications (i.e., decoding of Low-density
parity-check (LDPC) codes, recommender and trust systems and ad-hoc networks).
BP-P2P computes the reputation values and trustworthiness parameters between
nodes on an appropriately chosen factor graph representation of the P2P network.
Detailed evaluation showed that BP-P2P is efficient in computing trustworthiness
values, filtering out malicious ratings and reducing the error in the reputation val-
ues of nodes. Compared to EigenTrust and Bayesian Framework, BP-P2P can more
effectively fight against malicious behaviors.
In spite of the functions that reputation management systems produce, most
previously proposed schemes are still vulnerable to free-riding, collusion and Sybil
attacks. In addition, a malicious node can always clean its bad history by creating
a new account in existing reputation management system based P2P file sharing
systems. Then, such malicious nodes will still be selected as servers in file sharing
transactions.
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2.2 Social Network Based Systems
Web sites such as Flickr [49], MySpace [50], Facebook [25] and Twitter [26]
are online social networks (OSNs), in which participating users communicate with
their real-world acquaintances and online friends. OSNs are continually growing both
in the number of communities and the overall population. Since a user’s friends are
usually trustworthy and share similar interests [51], online friendships are exploited to
perform reputation estimation. Also, the social phenomena such as friendship, trust,
and a sense of community in an OSN may influence the usability and performance of
P2P file sharing systems as much as technical issues [31]. Therefore, taking users as
social groups, rather than solitary rational agents [52], may reduce free-riding [6] in
the system due to the fact that users tend to share high quality files in their social
groups. Below, we introduce OSN-based approaches for encouraging node cooperation
in P2P file sharing systems.
Turtle [30] constructs an overlay over the preexisting trust relationship be-
tween users in the network to protect all nodes in a file query path by making them
anonymous. The main idea of Turtle is to use the “friend-to-friend” exchange in P2P
file sharing systems. Meanwhile, the distributed structure permits private and secure
transactions of sensitive files between a huge number of users, via an unreliable net-
work, in the absence of central control servers. Furthermore, the design of the trust
model allows Turtle to prevent most of the denial-of-service attacks.
Tribler [31], as a set of extensions to BitTorrent [4], utilizes social phenomena
such as friendship and the existence of communities of users with similar tastes to
increase the usability and performance of a P2P network. By maintaining social
networks and using these relationships for content operation (i.e., file discovery, file
recommendation, and downloading), Tribler capacitates quick, reliable file discovery
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and file recommendation at a low additional overhead, and a significant improvement
in file download performance.
Usenet [53] is a worldwide distributed Internet discussion system, which allows
users to read and post messages in different categories. F2F [32], as indicated in the
paper, is both a cooperative backup system and a Usenet replacement. In this system,
nodes select their neighbors based on existing social relationships. This approach
provides incentives for nodes to behave cooperatively and decreases the consumption
of data, which also creates a more stable system that remains scale.
MyNet [33] is a P2P platform of middleware with user interaction tools, which
allows participating users to safely use and share their devices, services, and file re-
sources with others without contacting any central control systems. MyNet allows
distributed services and files to be accessed and shared in real time as they are gen-
erated from personal devices of users directly. It offers a straightforward replacement
to existing web-based personal and social networks. The primary contributions of
MyNet are intuitive user interface (UI) tools of user interaction, resource discovery,
and security.
Since reputation value of a node is calculated based on historical information,
it is strongly influenced by high rates of churn - the continuous arrival and departure
of nodes. SocialHelpers [34] is an accurate model for capturing the influence of churn
on the process of building reputation values. The minimal transaction rate of a P2P
network can be determined by the model that guarantees fast convergence. Mean-
while, the inherent trust in social networks is leveraged to solve the problem of low
transaction rate of nodes (i.e., network bandwidth constraints, etc.). For example,
a node asks its social links to transact with strangers and they together generate
reputation values in a short time. The simulation results showed that SocialHelpers
performs 50% or greater reductions in the convergence time with high churn rates in
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a P2P network.
The authors of Social-P2P [35] studied trace data from Facebook and BitTor-
rent. They proposed the Social-P2P, a social network based P2P file sharing system,
based on their observations. It groups common-multi-interest nodes into a cluster
and further connects socially close nodes within a cluster. It achieves highly efficient
and trustworthy file sharing. Social-P2P has components of item interest/trust-based
structure construction, interest/trust-based file searching, and trust relationship ad-
justment to simultaneously achieve both efficient and trustworthy file querying with
low overhead in P2P file sharing systems.
However, OSN-based approaches limit transactions merely between friends.
Hence, such approaches violate the free and open environment of P2P networks. For
file resources outside of personal social networks, there is no effective solution to
guarantee the availability of files in most OSN-based approaches.
2.3 Attack-Defense Systems
Collusion and Sybil attacks are common threats in P2P file sharing systems,
which manipulate reputation values and take advantage of non-malicious nodes. Gen-
erally, the theory of collusion is similar to Sybil attacks. They are both launched by
a group of malicious nodes that give each other positive feedback to gain high rep-
utation. For instance, malicious nodes with high reputation values can “out vote”
non-malicious nodes in collaborative work [36]. The only difference is that collusion is
assisted by different users who know each other and all tend to violate rules to satisfy
themselves, yet a Sybil attack is started by one user with multiple fake accounts in
the system.
To defend against collusion and Sybil attacks, it is not enough to simply build
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a reputation management system based on each node’s transaction history since mali-
cious nodes can behave cooperatively at first, and then launch attacks to others. Even
though a central control authority can solve Sybil attacks by asking users to provide
sensitive personal information (i.e., ID number, social security number) or requiring
payment [54], finding such an authority that most users trust can be very difficult
in P2P networks. One of common approaches applied to existing P2P networks to
defend against Sybil attacks is to bind user accounts to IP addresses or IP prefixes.
Another approach is to ask users to solve puzzles that need human reaction, such as
CAPTCHAs [20] when a new account is created. Both approaches are insufficiently
effective because IP addresses with different prefixes can be easily stolen on the In-
ternet, while CAPTCHAs can be solved by some software quickly. In addition, all
approaches mentioned are not helpful to avoid the damage from collusion or Sybil
attacks.
SybilGuard [36] is a distributed protocol that defends against Sybil attacks.
This protocol ensures that the number of attack edges between honest regions (i.e.,
the region including all non-malicious nodes) and Sybil regions (i.e., the region with
all Sybil nodes that created by malicious nodes) are not related to the number of Sybil
nodes, and are restricted by the number of reliable relationship pairs among malicious
nodes and non-malicious nodes. SybilGuard depends on a special kind of confirmable
random walk and the intersections between such walks. These walks are designed to
restrict the number of Sybil nodes that malicious nodes can create. The foundation of
SybilGuard is the assumption that Sybil nodes usually have disproportionately small
number of attack edges with non-malicious nodes.
SybilLimit [37] leverages the same insight as SybilGuard, yet is a significant
improvement and a near-optimal protocol for real-world social networks. It is called
SybilLimit because it limits the number of accepted Sybil nodes and the approach
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is pushed to the limit. With crawling data from three large-scale (almost 1,000,000
nodes) real-world social network, the authors discovered that a user in a group tends
to connect with another user in a different group within a quite small number of
hops (10 to 20 hops), which means social networks are truly fast mixing. SybilLimit
effectively limits Sybil attacks in fast mixing social networks by validating the basic
assumption behind the direction of leveraging social networks.
Li et. al [38] enhanced the capability of reputation management systems in
combating collusion by leveraging social networks. The analysis of real trace data
from the Overstock online auction platform, which incorporates a social network, re-
veals the significant impact of the social network on user consumption and reputation
rating patterns. Thus, the authors proposed a social network based mechanism, that
identifies suspicious collusion behavior patterns to counter collusion. The mechanism
adaptively adjusts the weight of ratings based on the social distance and interest rela-
tionship between nodes. It significantly improves the capability of current reputation
management systems in combating collusion.
By analyzing transactions ratings in Amazon and Overstock, Li et. al [39]
confirmed the existence and influence of collusion in such online transaction platforms.
They proposed a collusion detection method to thwart collusion behaviors and further
optimized it to reduce the computing cost. In the method, the reputation manager(s)
detects collusion based on collected rating values and rating frequency between nodes.
If two high-reputed nodes give high ratings to each other at a high frequency, while
they receive low ratings from other nodes, the two nodes are suspected colluders.
Experimental results show that the proposed method can significantly enhance the
capability of existing reputation management systems to detect collusion with low
cost.
R-Rep [40] is a trust system that resists reputation manipulation by using clus-
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tering algorithm k-means to identify malicious sellers and buyers. Negative influence
imposed by malicious nodes is largely restricted by R-Rep. Meanwhile, it detects ma-
licious sellers and buyers intensively by comparing statistics of the whole population
with a malicious subpopulation. R-Rep achieves better performance compared to the
trust system employed by Taobao (the largest online marketplace in China) and a
Bayesian System.
Bazaar [21] is a trust system for online marketplaces, where buyers and sell-
ers do not have previous relationships and accounts are easy to create. Running
by the marketplace operator, Bazaar establishes shared risk between two users and
constructs a risk network based on transaction history between buyers and sellers.
Bazaar protects buyers in online marketplaces by managing shared risk according to
buyers’ feedback to sellers when a transaction is completed. The smallest shared risk
on a link between a buyer and a seller is called max-flow, which is used to restrict
the money amount of transactions the seller is allowed to process. Such an approach
prevents buyers from being deceived by malicious sellers, who are disconnected to
non-malicious buyers through negative feedback. Bazaar can prevent whitewash, col-
lusion and Sybil attacks in online marketplaces. An evaluation based on the real data
trace crawled from eBay proves that Bazaar is able to limit the number of fraudulent
transactions with only slight influence on non-malicious users. The “weighted trans-
action network” in the design of SocialLink is similar to Bazaar’s; however, SocialLink
is specifically for P2P file sharing systems rather than online marketplaces.
SocialTrust [1] combines a social network and improved reputation manage-
ment system to save querying cost and prevent malicious behaviors. With manageable
friend-list and partner-list in SocialTrust, nodes share files directly within their social
networks without querying reputation values. Though file resources are reliable from
friends/partners, the scope of files that can be obtained from social network is too
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limited. To solve this problem, the authors of SocialTrust proposed specific repu-
tation rewarding and punishing algorithms to award cooperative nodes and punish
non-cooperative nodes. Furthermore, the number of friends/partners and reputation
value of a node are considered in rewarding and punishing nodes to realize accu-
rate reputation evaluation and strong cooperation incentives. For example, given a
number of server options, the client directly selects a friend or partner, if available,
without querying their reputation values. Otherwise, the client chooses a server from
non-friends with the highest reputation value. As a result, the social network encour-
ages nodes to have transactions with their friends and partners since friends/partners
produce high QoS transactions and low querying cost.
Adopting these attack-defense systems leads to additional overhead. In this
thesis, we aim to develop a trust system that can handle the common threats (i.e., free-
riding, whitewash, collusion and Sybil attacks) by itself in P2P file sharing systems.
2.4 Recommendation Systems
Recommendation systems are personalized services that intend to increase
purchasing intentions and enhance experience of consumers [55]. Both recommenda-
tion system and reputation management system affect purchase intention or server
selection of consumers by providing information. According to personal interests
of consumers, recommended products are more acceptable to consumers. Similarly,
feedback-based trust systems impose a significant influence on the attitude and sever
selection of clients as well.
Trust enabled Argumentation Based Recommender System (TABRS) [41] is
an agent-based recommendation system, which uses a hybrid approach to recommend
items of interest to consumers and convince the consumers with improved recommen-
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dations by using argumentation about products. TABRS takes each consumer as an
agent and applies an automated argumentation between them. It keeps tracking con-
sumers’ changing preferences to generate interesting recommendations and improves
recommendation repair activity by discovering interesting alternatives based on con-
sumers’ underlying mental attitudes. The system is implemented by using Jason for
building agents enabled with inference and interaction capabilities and is applied on
a Book Recommender System.
Aspect Oriented Recommender System (AORS) [42] is a multi agent system
that uses Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) to prevent profiles injection attacks
for collaborative recommendation systems. A conventional agent oriented approach
leads to code scattering, code tangling and weak enforcement of security concern.
On the contrary, AORS solves security crosscutting in a modular way by removing
scattering and tangling problems for a book recommendation system.
Since the most relevant items from a recommendation system may not sat-
isfy consumers recently, Chiu et al. [43] proposed a social network-based serendipity
(SNS) recommendation system. With a notice of the growing social networks, this
system leverages the interactive information from the social network of a consumer
and discovers interesting items that cannot be realized by consumers.
Recommendation systems in P2P networks can assist reputation management
systems to ensure secure and timely availability of the reputation value of a node to
other nodes with extremely low costs. Dewan et al. [44] proposed a cryptographic
protocol that encapsulates the past behavior of a node in its digital reputation and
predicts its future actions. The reputation value of a node is based on a large number
of positive recommendations from its friends to raise, which motives the node to
behave cooperatively. Self-certification and cryptographic mechanisms are applied in
the cryptographic protocol to manage identities of nodes and resist Sybil attacks.
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Wang et al. [45] analyzed the existing trust systems in P2P networks and
proposed a novel P2P recommendation trust model based on social networks. The
model gives recommendations based on users’ interest and also utilizes a feedback-
based trust system to punish uncooperative behaviors. The recommendation system
and the reputation management system are combined in this model that can truly
evaluate individual behavior and effectively prevent malicious nodes.
P2P e-commerce is vulnerable to malicious threats. Musau et al. [46] generated
secret keys between each node and its neighbors to guarantee secure recommenda-
tions exchanged among nodes in P2P e-commerce. They also proposed “gkeying”,
which is a key management approach, to generate six types of keys for securing rec-
ommendations and ensuring the integrity of recommendations. With a security and
performance analysis, the authors claimed that the approach is more safe and more
efficient in terms of communications cost, computation cost, storage cost and feasi-
bility.
Recommendation systems are widely used by many commercial web sites to
assist consumers in selecting products and content. The systems analyze user behav-
iors to find patterns and usually make recommendations in the form of related-items
lists. Despite the scale and complexity of existing recommendation systems, pub-
lic recommendations may leak information about the behavior of individual users
to attackers. Because a recommendation system reveals item similarity lists and
item-to-item covariances based on all transactions, which includes ones that are not
voluntarily exposed by consumers, Calandrino et al. [47] developed some algorithms
which take a moderate amount of auxiliary information about a customer and in-
fer this customer’s transactions from temporal changes in the public outputs of a
recommender system.
22
2.5 Summary
This chapter presents the related work of this research in detail. In summary,
traditional reputation management systems only consider transaction history of nodes
in calculating reputation values, which cannot effectively prevent the aforementioned
common threats. Also, querying reputation values leads to additional overhead and
service latency. OSN-based approaches impose restrictions on abundant file resources
by sharing files with friends in the social network. Though attack-defense systems
can be directly adopted to handle each particular threat, they bring about significant
additional overhead. Meanwhile, some recommendation systems ([45], [44]) also use
social network and feedback-based approaches to improve their performance. Based
on previous research, we propose SocialLink, which integrates characteristics of many
novel ideas to save querying cost, avoid free-riding and reduce damage from malicious
behaviors (i.e., whitewash, collusion and Sybil attacks) in P2P file sharing systems.
23
Chapter 3
DESIGN OF SOCIALLINK
The design of SocialLink incorporates social networks, lightweight reliable
server selection and a weighted transaction network. The first two components are
adopted from SocialTrust [1]. As introduced in 2, SocialTrust builds friend/partner re-
lationships for trustable file sharing to reduce reputation querying cost, and it achieves
an accurate reputation evaluation by considering the number of friends/partners and
the reputation of a node in rewarding and punishing nodes. Upon friend/partner file
querying failure, unlike SocialTrust that relies on the reputation management system,
SocialLink relies on a “weighted transaction network” to ensure that the client-server
transaction is trustable. For untrustable transactions, SocialLink can further rely on
reputation management systems to determine whether to proceed the transactions.
Below, we present the main components of SocialLink in detail including social net-
works, lightweight reliable server selection, weighted transaction network and security
issue handling.
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3.1 Social Networks
In a general online social network (OSN), a user’s friends include off-line friends
with certain social connections (e.g., relatives, friends, classmates, colleagues, etc.)
and online friends who they frequently interact with via the Internet. Similarly, the
social relationships of a node in SocialLink include both its off-line friends and trust-
worthy online friends. To achieve this, when a node joins the file sharing system,
it is notified that only trusted nodes can be added to the friend-list. For frequently
interacted nodes, SocialLink will notify users to add each other. Hence, the friendship
update (i.e., addition and deletion) in SocialLink is dependent on user behavior, and
users are responsible for the consequence of adding a new friend. In other words, ra-
tional users would be cautious in accepting friend invitations since friends are selected
directly as servers in a transaction.
Friendship in the design of SocialLink is user centric, meaning each user main-
tains its own friend-list. For example, node A wants to add another node, say B, into
its friend-list. Then, A sends a friend request to B. If B accepts the request, they be-
come friends. When A deletes B for some reason, they remove each other from their
friend list. At first, A can only add real-life friends. After a while, file resources from
friends are not sufficient. Then, by connecting through some friends, A downloaded
many files from a node, say C. Then, A becomes a “follower” of C, and meanwhile,
C becomes the “followee” of A. At this time, the weight between these two nodes has
a direction pointing from C to A, which is denoted as “Wca. Similarly, when A sends
files to C, C is the “follower” of A, and A becomes the “followee” with a weight Wac
pointing from A to C. SocialLink notifies A and C whether they desire to be friends
(or partners in SocialTrust) of each other when both Wca and Wac reach a predefined
threshold. For simplicity, we call both friends and partners in SocialTrust friends in
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SocialLink. If either of Wca or Wac is below the threshold, A and C are deleted from
their friend-list separately. If a node has plenty of friends, the probability of querying
the reputations of servers is reduced, thus saving its reputation querying overhead.
Meanwhile, more friends mean more file resources. Therefore, a node would not delete
friends arbitrarily.
All friends in SocialLink represent a certain level of trustworthiness. Users
connected by certain social relationships in a social community would offer high QoS
to each other due to their intention of building high real-life reputations. Users
do not wish to damage their real-life reputations in their social communities (e.g.,
research lab or department) as a result of their misbehavior. Thus, a real-world
friendship network motivates nodes to be cooperative continuously. On the other
hand, frequently interacted nodes of a node also have high probabilities to offer high
QoS to the node according to their previous cooperative behaviors in their long-
term collaboration. Therefore, in order to maintain the online friendship, which is
a reflection of its trustworthiness, nodes would not arbitrarily decrease the QoS in
transactions. Furthermore, the mechanism of a friendship network also motivates
nodes to keep increasing their reputations to establish more friendships, which helps
to save more reputation querying cost and find more linked nodes via friends.
3.2 Lightweight Reliable Server Selection
Since the friendship represents certain trustworthiness, we exploit this property
to alleviate the reputation querying cost. That is, a node directly selects friends when
available for service without querying their reputation. In case several friends appear
in the available server list, each node also maintains local ranks for its friends by
recording its rating on their trust levels after an interaction with them.
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Figure 3.1 shows the process of a client’s operation in server selection. When a
client needs a service, it first identifies the available servers for the requested service.
For example, a node uses the P2P file lookup function (i.e. Distributed Hash Table)
to identify all file owners for its requested file. The client then checks whether any
of its friend(s) are in the list. If yes, it skips the step of querying the reputation
of available servers and selects a friend with the highest local ranking as the server
directly. If there is no friend in the server list, it queries the reputation of each server,
and chooses the one that is recommended by SocialLink. After the transaction is
completed, the client sends the feedback (positive, neutral, negative) to SocialLink.
If the service is from a friend, the node also records the transferred file size for local
ranking and friend-of-friend connections. When a node receives a number of service
requests at the same time, it first chooses the client that is its friend, and then gives
priorities to clients based on the linked weights between them.
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Figure 3.1: The process of a client’s server selection (from SocialTrust [1]).
We then deduce the percentage of reputation queries (Prq) that can be avoided
in SocialLink. We assume that the servers that can satisfy a request are evenly
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distributed among all nodes. We use C to denote the total number of nodes in the
system. Let ci be the number of service requests generated by node i, Ns be the
average number of available servers for each request, and nf be the number of friends
node i has. Node i is the client, and the probability that none of the available servers
is node i’s friend (Pnon) can be calculated by Pnon = (1− nf/C)Ns . Then,
Prq =
C∑
i=1
((1− (1− nf/C)Ns)Nsci)/
C∑
i=1
Nsci (3.1)
Note that in an OSN, a node is more likely to find requested files from its friends
since they share similar interests and behaviorss, which means that our estimated Prq
should actually be larger.
As shown in Equation (3.1), the more friends a node has, the more reputation
queries (i.e., cost) it can avoid. The real-world friendship is usually stable and online
friendship between two nodes is primarily decided by their successful transactions.
As a result, a node would not struggle in the system alone but would like to add
friends to save more cost on reputation querying.
3.3 The Weighted Transaction Network
In this subsection, we introduce the core component of SocialLink: weighted
transaction network. A P2P file sharing system is always vulnerable for threats, such
as free-riding, whitewash, collusion and Sybil attacks. As introduced in Chapter 1,
free-riding and whitewash are individual behaviors, yet collusion and Sybil attacks
involve interactions between malicious users and non-malicious users. Consequently,
nodes are divided into colluding groups and normal groups. In Figure 3.2, the con-
nections between a colluding group and normal group are called “attack edges [36]”.
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A group of malicious nodes utilize attack edges to damage non-malicious nodes out-
side the group. For example, some malicious nodes share a large amount of files with
their friends to achieve high reputation values, then pollute malware to non-malicious
nodes outside the group.
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Figure 3.2: Attack edges between a colluding group and a normal group.
A trust system should avoid free-riding, prevent damage from whitewash, collu-
sion and Sybil attacks by bounding attack edges from malicious nodes. Accordingly,
SocialLink uses a weighted transaction network to meet these requirements. The
weighted transaction network is comprised of directional weighted links according to
successful transactions. Two non-friend nodes that have ever conducted a successful
transaction are connected together from the server to the client, with the weight equal
to transferred file size. The direction of a link shows who contributed the file, which
is used to prevent free-riding; nodes can only download file resources from non-friend
nodes after they upload to others in SocialLink. When such two nodes exchange
files, the link between them will be bi-directional with different weight values on each
direction.
Unlike global reputation value in existing reputation management systems,
directional weighted links are concealed by SocialLink to prevent manipulation. So-
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cialLink maintains the weighted transaction network and informs nodes whether po-
tential transactions are trustable. Such design limits attack edges from malicious
nodes to non-malicious nodes since links are based on actual transactions and can-
not be manipulated. After a client identifies the available servers for its requested
file, it sends a trust checking request to the central server along with the IDs of
these servers. Then the central server searches one or many paths pointing from
each available server to the client within predefined hops. To be noted, the direction
of a path has to be continuously pointing from the server to the client one by one.
This configuration confirms past transactions are conducted successfully through the
path. Then, the central server examines “available-flow”, which is the smallest link
weight in a server-client path that indicates the minimum file size the client received
via this path. Similarly, the central server examines “download-flow”, which is the
smallest link weight in a client-server path that indicates the minimum file size the
client sent via this path. Thus, SocialLink only enables the client to download file size
no larger than the available-flow and download-flow. Transactions between two non-
friend nodes with no path from the server to the client or from the client to the server,
or with a available-flow or download-flow smaller than the requested file size are con-
sidered as potentially fraudulent, which are marked as suspicious by SocialLink. Once
suspicious transactions are discovered, they can be resolved in various ways that will
be discussed in Section 3.3.4. For unsuspicious transactions, clients cannot determine
whether the files received are legitimate immediately. Hence, there is a time period
before servers are punished by negative feedback for providing malware. In this pe-
riod, links from the server to the client are held to prevent the server from behaving
maliciously to other nodes. Also, the links from the client to the server are held to
prevent the client from free-riding. After receiving feedback from the client, links in
the paths from the server to the client are updated according to the type of feedback.
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Furthermore, “six degrees of separation” [56] indicates that two people are
connected by a maximum of six steps in the world on average. Thus, we set the
server-client path length in the weighted transaction network to 5 hops. If a client
cannot find a path from the server to itself within 5 hops, the transactions is identified
as suspicious by SocialLink. Meanwhile, the number of hops for a client to find a server
is changeable to adapt to different scalable networks.
3.3.1 Using and Building Links
In the weighted transaction network, links between nodes are established based
on transaction history. Figure 3.3 shows a part of weighted transaction network, nodes
(A, B and C) are non-friends to each other, and nodes (A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, C1, C2,
and C3) around them are their friends, respectively. There are two links with two
directions between pairs of nodes, as shown by dotted lines and solid lines in the figure.
Dotted lines are links between friends and solid lines are links between non-friends.
The link on each direction has a weight generated based on file sharing history, as
shown by a number on the link in the figure. All links with weights are saved by
SocialLink for future queries. Even transactions between friends are unlimited, links
between friends are still stored for paths that through friend-of-friend connections.
Friend-of-friend connections are links between two non-friend nodes with one node
is a friend of friend of another node. When node A has successfully received a 6MB
file from node B, a link with 6 weight value is established from B to A. When A
successfully sends a 5MB file to B, a new link with 5 weight value pointing from
A to B is created. Note that the link weight must always be non-negative and the
minimum value is 0. On the other hand, file sharing between friends is unlimited on
both directions. Therefore, we use dashed lines between friends in order to explain
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the flow of transferred files. For example, links between A and A1 have two directions
but no weight.
When a client requests a file from non-friend nodes, SocialLink first identifies
available servers with the requested file and then detects paths from available servers
to the client. We define the available-flow as the smallest value on a path from the
server to the client. We define the download-flow as the smallest value on the reverse
direction from the client to the server. A client’s requested file size from the server
must be no larger than not only the available-flow but also the download-flow. In this
way, SocialLink ensures that the server has high probability to provide the requested
file and the client is not a free-rider.
When client C requests a file from server B, the available-flow equals 6, which
is the smallest weight on the path of B → A→ C. Similarly, the download-flow from
B to C is 5, which is the smallest weight on the reverse direction on C → A → B.
As a result, the maximum file size C can download from B is 5 since the download-
flow is smaller than the available-flow. In other words, the larger available-flow and
download-flow of a path, the more file resources that the client can download from
the server or that the server can provide to the client.
We explain the process of a transaction specifically by using Figure 3.3. When
C1 sends a file request and B2 owns the file, C1 is the client and B2 is the available
server. Because B2 is not a friend of C1, C1 queries SocialLink to ask whether the
transaction from B2 will be fraudulent. Then SocialLink examines links from B2 to
C1, and finds out a reliable path from B2 → B → A → C → C1. The available-
flow on this path is 6, and the download-flow from C1 → C → A → B → B2 on
this path is 5. Finally, SocialLink selects the smaller value from available-flow and
download-flow, which is 5 in this case, and notifies C1 that files smaller than 5MB are
available to download from B2. Consequently, the smaller value from available-flow
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Figure 3.3: A part of P2P file sharing system with SocialLink.
and download-flow on a path is the total file size client can download from the server.
If multiple paths exist between the client and the server, the one with the largest file
size that the client can download will be selected.
From the process of a transaction, we can see that the linked weights are not
publicly accessible by all nodes; SocialLink only notifies nodes that potential trans-
actions are fraudulent or not. In this way, it is difficult for malicious nodes to find
nodes to compromise in order to gain unfair benefits. With the approaches in So-
cialLink, even if malicious nodes collude or create Sybils to grow their reputations,
it will not affect non-malicious nodes if there are few successful transactions between
malicious nodes and non-malicious nodes. On the contrary, reputation value in ex-
isting reputation management systems is usually a global value based on transaction
history and can be queried by all other nodes in the system. In that case, everyone
can view reputation value of a node without knowing if there is any dishonest feed-
back in the process of building the current value. Malicious nodes can easily exploit
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these drawbacks to achieve high reputation values by collusion and creating Sybils.
Then, malicious nodes gain many chances to spread malware to non-malicious nodes.
Also, the disclosure of reputation values enables malicious nodes to easily identify
and compromise true high-reputed nodes to spread malware.
Take Figure 3.3 as another example. Suppose C is a malicious node with
three colluding nodes or Sybils (C1, C2 and C3) and C is able to build links with
them with very high weights. But C only received 8MB files from A and sent 7MB
files to A successfully. Based on that, C is allowed to download 7MB from A. To
node B, C can download a file smaller than 5MB since the download-flow is 5 on
the path from C → A → B. By doing this, C cannot download from A and B if
it does not contribute to them. When C provides a low QoS transaction to A and
receives negative feedback from A, the link pointing from C to A will disappear. Then
transactions conducted from C to A will be marked as suspicious by SocialLink and
are blocked. Therefore, neither C nor its friends can conduct low QoS transactions to
A and B anymore. Regardless of how large weight C built with its friends (C1, C2
and C3), no transaction can be conducted from them without a link pointing from C
to A. Hence, node C and its colluding nodes or Sybils are not able to launch attacks
to node A, B and their friends. As a malicious node, C may want to clear the history
by deleting its current account and creating a new one. When C deletes the current
account, all links between C and other nodes (includes its friends) are removed.
Then C creates a new account without any links to other nodes and must conduct
transactions in order to build links. Therefore, whitewash is useless in manipulating
links.
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3.3.2 Holding Links
In a P2P file sharing system, some malicious nodes spread as many as possible
malwares to non-malicious nodes. In SocialLink, a malicious node can create a link
with a very large weight to a non-malicious node, then it can conduct many trans-
actions with non-malicious nodes to spread malwares. These non-malicious nodes
cannot notice the malicious node until they receive the malware. Hence, before So-
cialLink receives the negative feedback of the malicious node, it still has time to
make damage. To prevent this vulnerability, SocialLink “holds the link” during a
transaction time until it is finished, so the link cannot be used for other transactions.
As introduced in the previous section, SocialLink finds a path set from the
server to the client, then determines the paths with available-flow or download-flow
that is larger or equal to the requested file size. If such multiple paths exist, SocialLink
selects the path with the highest smaller value of available-flow and download-flow.
After SocialLink notifies the client that the transaction to a server is available, the
client asks the server for the file and the server then sends the file to the client. When
SocialLink is waiting for feedback from the client on the server, the linked weights
between them are reduced by the file size temporarily to prevent more transactions
from the server via the path before receiving the feedback. The update of linked
weight is executed after the transaction is finished.
Figure 3.4 reveals the process of holding links when a transaction is conducted
between node A and node D. In Figure 3.4(a), the original relationships of A, B,
C and D are non-friends to each other here. Suppose A requires an 8MB file from
D, and SocialLink finds two paths for A. Because the available-flow on the path of
D → C → A is 7, which is less than the requested file size (8MB), this path cannot be
used for this transaction. The available-flow on the path of D → B → A is 15, which
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indicates that this transaction is trustable. Meanwhile, the download-flow on the
path of A→ B → D is 12, which means A is available to download less than 12MB
files on this path. Under this circumstance, all weights on both paths from D to A are
reduced by 8 to prevent additional transactions via these paths. Figure 3.4(b) shows
the results after update. Since the value of linked weight is defined as a non-negative
number, the result after the temporal reduction on the link on C → A is 0 instead
of −1 (7 − 8 = −1). In spite of not using the path of D → C → A, weights on this
path are also reduced to prevent other nodes having transactions from D through
this unused path. In other words, node D can only conduct one transaction to node
A at one time and cannot upload files to other nodes at the same time through the
same path. Note D is still able to download files from other nodes since the reverse
direction link is not reduced.
Similarly, in order to prevent a client from requesting many files by taking
advantage of its out-going links with high weights, the links in the identified client-
server path with download-flow larger than the file size should also be held. As this
operation is the same as the server-client path, we do not present the details of this
operation.
This approach prevents malicious nodes from spreading malwares to non-
malicious nodes before malicious nodes are punished based on negative feedback.
On account of temporarily reduced link weights, paths are held before receiving feed-
back. When requested file size from another client is bigger than temporary linked
weights from involved nodes, the transaction will not be performed. The link weights
will be updated after the central server receives the feedback from the client on the
server. We will discuss the details of the updating in the next section.
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(a) Before the transaction (b) Waiting for feedback
(c) With negative feedback (d) With positive feedback
20 15
7 10
12
0
7
2
17
A
B
C
D
1612
12
20
A
B
C
D
107
15
12 16
17 12
20
A
B
C
D
107
15
8
12 16
17 12
12
A
B
C
D
2
12
7
17 12
16
Figure 3.4: Process of sharing an 8M file between node A and node D
3.3.3 Updating Links
In the previous section, we introduced how link weights are temporarily re-
duced during a transaction. In this section, we present how the weight values are
updated after the central server receives the feedback from the client on the server
upon the completion of the transaction. There are three kinds of feedback in So-
cialLink: positive feedback, neutral feedback and negative feedback. Based on the
different feedback, the weight values are updated differently. We introduce the details
of the updating below.
• Positive feedback. With a successful file transaction, the client will provide
positive feedback for the server. At this time, the temporarily reduced weight
is restored and a new link is established directly from the server to the client
that is weighted by the size of the transferred file as shown in Figure 3.4(d).
Such cooperative behavior between nodes builds more links, which make more
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file resources to be shared between nodes in the future.
• Neutral feedback. If the client reports a neutral feedback, SocialLink only
restores the temporarily reduced weight without creating a new link. A neutral
feedback means that the file from the server is not a malware, but the client is
not totally satisfied (i.e., not very good quality, wrong files, etc). In this case,
it is not necessary to punish the server, and the client may want to keep the
link to the server for future transaction. Since there is no change in weighted
transaction network, all links are reverted to their original states as shown in
Figure 3.4(a).
• Negative feedback. When the server supplies faulty files that damage the
client, such as malware or a virus, the non-malicious client will provide neg-
ative feedback. Under this circumstance, SocialLink permanently lowers the
weights by the size of the transferred file in each link along the paths (i.e.,
keeps the temporarily reduced weights) without creating any new link as shown
in Figure 3.4(c). The reduced weight value or available-flow between two nodes
indicates that the client is less likely to download files from the server in the
future. If one node is accused with negative feedback from many nodes fre-
quently, all links of the node will be removed eventually, and it cannot provide
files to other nodes. This is a serious punishment and also a warning to nodes
that connect to malicious nodes.
• No feedback. It is common that some nodes do not provide feedback after
transactions. When there is no feedback after transaction, after a configurable
timeout of T , SocialLink restores the temporarily reduced weights between
nodes without creating a new link, which is the same as in the case when a
neutral feedback is provided.
38
The number of a node’s links connecting with non-friends depends on the
node’s behavior. Cooperative behavior results in many out-going links and hence
more chances to receive file resources. Such a scheme can encourage nodes to conduct
high-QoS transactions with non-friends and provide honest feedback. For instance,
due to the fact that file resources are quite limited from a node’s friends, the more
non-friends a node connects to, the more file resources it can retrieve from outside
of its social network. Therefore, non-malicious nodes give positive feedback to high
QoS transactions to gain more file resources, yet provide negative feedback to low
QoS transactions to prevent damage from malicious nodes. Suppose a malicious node
provides negative feedback to all transactions it receives, it will be isolated from other
nodes and cannot harm non-malicious nodes without any directional weighted links.
3.3.4 Central Server and Suspicious Transactions
SocialLink has a central server (called the “trust center”) that maintains the
weighted transaction network, and checks the fraudulence of each transaction in the
P2P file sharing system. However, suspicious transactions are potentially fraudulent
but are not definitely fraudulent. In other words, a suspicious transaction only stands
for the scenario that the client has no relationship or any file sharing transaction
history with the server. There is no evidence to show that the server is a malicious
node. SocialLink has several methods to process suspicious transactions.
Different kinds of P2P file sharing applications can have different methods to
handle suspicious transactions. For instance, suspicious transactions can be simply
blocked for some sensitive networks to avoid any possible fraudulent file transactions.
In this case, the weighted transaction network is initialized by the transactions be-
tween friends. Yu et al. [37] indicated that the links in a social group are usually
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much denser than links between groups. Therefore, the transactions between friends
will create paths between non-friends nodes gradually.
However, it may take a long time to build paths between non-friends through
the transactions between friends. It is very likely that a server is not a client’s friend in
the large-scale P2P file sharing system. Also, simply blocking suspicious transactions
conflicts with the objective of wide file sharing in large-scale P2P file sharing systems.
If the client or server still wants to continue the transaction though it is identified as
suspicious, the system can have both the file from the server and the request from the
client sent to trust center. Then, the trust center checks the trustworthiness of the
file and forwards the trustworthy file to the client to assure the QoS and security of
suspicious transactions. However, this method requires the involvement of the central
server. Another method is that the client further checks the reputation value of the
server. If the reputation value shows that the server is trustable, the client receives
the file from the server. Recall that reputation management systems cannot deal with
some threats such as whitewash, collusion and Sybil attacks. However, since clients
first rely on the weighted transaction network to identify the servers to request files,
and only rely on the reputation value for suspicious transactions, the adverse effects
from these threats are mitigated.
In addition, the central server also stores user account and the social net-
work for users to prevent leakage of sensitive personal information. Meanwhile, the
weighted transaction network cannot be modified or forged by malicious nodes in the
system since all data is maintained safely in the trust center. In our future work, we
will extend the centralized operations in the central server to a decentralized manner,
which is more suitable for the distributed P2P file sharing system. Basically, each
node maintains its links with nodes it has had transactions and uses broadcasting
to find the valid pathes from servers with non-friends to check the fraudulency of
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transactions.
3.4 Security Issues
In this section, we explain how SocialLink is able to handle free-riding, white-
wash, collusion and Sybil attacks, respectively.
In free-riding, a node always receives files from others without contributing
its own files. SocialLink requires that the download-flow of a client’s out-going link
path to the server must be no less then the size of the client’s requested file. By this
requirement, a client must contribute in order to receive files.
Whitewash is a common method for malicious nodes to clear all of their bad
histories. In the weighted transaction network, a node’s links are created only based
on successful transactions. Therefore, if a node creates a new account, it must have
successful transactions with other nodes in order to create links with other nodes so
that it can receive or provide files. Also, in the social network, transactions between
friends are unlimited, which is not affected by whitewash either. As a result, there is
no incentive for malicious nodes to create new accounts.
In collusion, some malicious nodes raise each other’s reputation value to take
advantage of non-malicious nodes. In SocialLink, colluding nodes can generate fake
transactions to build highly weighted links between each other in the weighted trans-
action network. However, without links (i.e., attack edges) to other non-malicious
nodes outside the collusion group, all transactions that are conducted by malicious
nodes to non-malicious nodes would be marked as suspicious. Then, the servers for
non-suspicious transactions have higher probability to be selected to provide files to
the clients. Also, suspicious transactions will be either blocked or inspected by the
trust center carefully to avoid damaging the system. Hence, colluding nodes have few
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chances to send files to non-malicious nodes outside of their collusion groups.
Sybil attacks are similar to collusion in P2P file sharing systems. Instead of
individual colluding nodes, Sybil attacks are implemented by one node with different
accounts in the system. Therefore, SocialLink prevents Sybil attacks by using the
same approach as for thwarting collusion, i.e. limiting attack edges from attackers to
normal nodes.
Whether clients are incentivized to provide honest feedback on transactions
is an important issue. All file transactions between nodes are based on links and
their weights. Transactions from unlinked servers are marked as suspicious. A suspi-
cious transaction will be blocked or a client needs extra time and cost to ensure the
trustworthiness of the transaction. Therefore, nodes hope that their transactions will
not be suspicious transactions. The more links a node has, the more file resources a
node can receive or provide. From the perspective of non-malicious nodes, they do
not have motivation to give false feedback to remove links from cooperative servers
and add new links to non-cooperative servers. For malicious nodes, if they give false
negative feedback to non-malicious nodes, then the weighted links to non-malicious
nodes may be removed, which does not bring benefits to the malicious nodes.
3.5 Summary of Research Design
This section explains the design of SocialLink. SocialLink saves querying cost
and decreases free-riding. Meanwhile, it also alleviates damage from whitewash, col-
lusion and Sybil attacks in P2P file sharing systems.
As developed based on SocialTrust, SocialLink is constituted by three main
components: social networks, lightweight server selection and a weighted transaction
network. In order to maintain a friendly social network and save querying cost, nodes
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actively share their own file resources with friends. Lightweight server selection allows
SocialLink to save querying cost for nodes by immediately selecting trustworthy file
resources from friends without querying their reputation in P2P file sharing systems.
The weighted transaction network contains directional weighted links around
all nodes is established by SocialLink to guarantee file resources from non-friends are
reliable as well. Since file resources are quite limited between friends, they can only
be obtained from non-friends by building directional weighted links. The weights
of links are updated instantaneously after transactions between nodes to reveal the
latest trustworthiness. As a result, the more files a node shares with non-friends, the
more files a node can receive from them. In other words, SocialLink encourages nodes
to share files with others in order to prevent free-riding.
Common threats such as whitewash are executable yet useless with SocialLink.
When a new account is created, the node needs to establish friendships and trans-
action links completely again. Building highly weighted links depends on successful
transactions and positive feedback, which are obtained by providing high QoS trans-
actions. Hence, whitewash only helps a malicious node start over and become a non-
malicious one. In addition, collusion and Sybil attacks are prevented by SocialLink
through limiting attack edges to non-malicious nodes. Colluding nodes and Sybils
are all malicious nodes, which are able to form their own colluding group. However,
without links to non-malicious nodes, transactions generated by malicious nodes will
be either blocked or inspected by the trust center or by the reputation management
system carefully. This approach cuts down attack edges from the colluding group
to the rest of the system to prevent collusion and Sybil attacks in P2P file sharing
systems.
With cost saving, incentive sharing and reliable resource finding, SocialLink
realizes both high efficiency and security for P2P file sharing systems.
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Chapter 4
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We conducted extensive simulation to show the performance of SocialLink in
saving querying cost, preventing malicious behaviors, accuracy in detecting bad nodes’
transactions, and scalability. Coded in Java, the simulation is carried out on a desktop
containing Intel Core i5-2400 CPU at 3.10GHz and 4GB memory. The experiment
platform is Eclipse SDK running on both Linux and Windows 7 Professional operating
systems.
We analyzed the trace from LiveJournal [57] to construct a social network
for nodes. LiveJournal is a online service for journals and blogs with millions of
blogs and thousands of communities. Specifically, we randomly selected a medium
social network with 5,000 nodes from the trace to build the friendship links between
nodes in our simulation. We define three types of nodes: good, neutral and bad. We
randomly selected 10% of nodes as bad nodes, which are also known as malicious
nodes. Bad nodes provide low-quality files and dishonest feedback. They always
give negative feedback to non-malicious nodes and give positive feedback to their
colluding nodes and Sybils. We randomly selected 70% and 20% of nodes as good
nodes and neutral nodes, which are also known as non-malicious nodes. Good nodes
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behave cooperatively by providing high-quality files and honest feedback. Neutral
nodes provide medium-quality files, and they provide positive feedback to friends
(regardless of the file quality) and honest feedback to non-friends.
We configured 1,000 files with unique IDs and sizes randomly selected from
[1,1000] MB. Specifically, 70% of files have high quality and they are owned by good
nodes, 20% of files have medium quality and they are possessed by neutral nodes,
and the rest 10% of files have low quality and they are disseminated by bad nodes
to cause damage to others. We also define the quality of files by levels from 1 to
10 to distinguish different types of files. Good files have quality level from 7 to 10,
neutral files have quality level from 4 to 6 and bad files have quality level from 1 to
3. There are n available servers containing each file, and n is randomly selected from
[1,5] considering the scale of the P2P network is not large. The file holders for each
high-quality, medium-quality and low-quality file are randomly selected from good,
neutral and bad nodes, respectively. When the size of the P2P file sharing system
is enlarged by m times, the number of the files is also enlarged by m times with the
same percentages of good, neutral and bad nodes. Even transactions between friends
are unlimited, weights between nodes are initialized to 0.
We run each experiment for 100 rounds in simulation. Each node connects
to real-world friends first, and then adds its frequently contacted nodes (i.e., online
friends) to its friend list when the weights on both directions between two nodes
reach the threshold W , which is set to 20 in our experiments. Directional weighted
links between non-friend nodes are established after successful transactions. In each
round, every node generates a file request once so that the total number of transac-
tions occurred equals the total number of nodes. The requested files of a node were
randomly selected from the list of files not possessed by the node, and the requested
files are always searched from friends first. Based on the quality of received file and
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the type of the client, different kinds of feedback were given to the selected server. A
node can share its received corresponding files with other nodes; that is, good nodes
share high-quality files, bad nodes share low-quality files and neutral nodes share
medium-quality files.
We compare SocialLink with SocialTrust [1], a social network based reputation
management system. As introduced in the related work section, with an integrated
social network, SocialTrust uses a novel algorithm to calculate reputation value to
reward cooperative behaviors and punish uncooperative behaviors. The friendships
between nodes are established and the reputation value of each node in SocialTrust
is initialized to 0 before the 1st round. Afterwards, the reputation value of a node is
increased by 2 upon receiving a positive feedback, is decreased by 2 upon receiving
a negative feedback and remains the same for a neutral feedback. Consequently, the
reputation values are ranged in [−∞,+∞] because reputation values of bad nodes can
be negative numbers if they keep receiving negative feedbacks. SocialTrust selects a
server with highest reputation value if there are more than one available servers for
requested files. The threshold R of being selected as clients is set to 0 unless otherwise
specified. When the reputation value of a node is smaller than R, its service request
will be rejected from its non-friend nodes.
Due to the fact that SocialLink and SocialTrust both operate on central severs,
a simulated trust center is implemented to reply reputation queries from nodes. A
Distributed Hash Table (DHT)-based P2P system structure is applied for file search-
ing. That is, nodes form into a DHT, and the IP addresses of file holders are stored
in the successor of the file ID. Thus, by lookup DHT function, a client can find all file
holders of its requested file. Recall that in SocialLink, suspicious transactions can be
blocked or a reputation management system can be used to select the server with the
highest reputation value. We use SocialLink-B and SocialLink-R to denote SocialLink
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with these two strategies, respectively, and tested their performance in experiments.
We also use the accumulated number that includes the results from previous rounds
in some figures.
4.1 Querying Cost Reduction
By enabling friends to share files with each other, both SocialLink and So-
cialTrust reduce reputation querying overhead. We thus measured the number of
transactions between friends (friend transactions in short) that do not require repu-
tation querying to show the performance in reducing reputation querying overhead.
Figure 4.1a and 4.1b show the number of total transactions occurred and the number
of friend transactions in each round in SocialLink-B, SocialTrust and SocialLink-R ,
respectively.
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Figure 4.1: Number of total and friend transactions in 100 rounds.
In Figure 4.1a, we observe that the number of total transactions in each round
conducted by SocialLink-B is much smaller than those of SocialTrust and SocialLink-
R during the first 50 rounds and it increases to the maximum number at the 90th
round. This is because when the weighted transaction network is initialized, there are
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no directional weighted links between nodes since they have no transaction history.
Then, most transactions are marked as suspicious and blocked by SocialLink-B except
transactions between friends. As time goes on, SocialLink establishes more links
between nodes in the weighted transaction network. Then, fewer transactions are
blocked and the number of total transactions increases rapidly in the subsequent
rounds. On the other hand, SocialTrust and SocialLink-R have the total number of
5,000 transactions in every round since no transaction is blocked.
In Figure 4.1b, we see that the number of friend transactions in each round in
all systems increases as the total number of transactions increases. Because clients
share their received files with others, more transactions lead to more available servers
among a client’s friends for its request. Also, frequently connected nodes become
friends after a period of time. Therefore, clients are more likely to find their re-
quested files from their friends, thus increasing the number of friend transactions.
SocialLink-B generates fewer friend transactions than other two systems at first be-
cause suspicious transactions are blocked initially and file resources are not shared
widely. In the subsequent rounds, the establishment of the weighted transaction
network results in fewer suspicious transactions and wider file dissemination, which
generates more friend transactions. From the 50th round, SocialTrust loses the su-
periority of saving querying cost since more file resources are possessed by friends
in SocialLink-B. SocialLink-R produces similar number of friend transactions as So-
cialTrust in the first a few rounds because it does not block suspicious transactions.
Afterwards, SocialLink-R uses the weighted transaction network to identify trustable
servers and subsequently uses the reputation management system to identify servers
for suspicious transactions. As the file dissemination scope of SocialLink-R is similar
to that of SocialLink-B, they produce similar number of friend transactions in each
round.
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Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 48.44 59.05 67.94 71.16 76.26 81.68 83.47 87.40 87.80 89.36
SocialTrust (%) 44.04 56.94 66.52 70.18 74.82 80.30 83.00 86.32 86.54 87.04
SocialLink-R (%) 44.00 56.98 66.54 70.16 75.20 81.10 83.02 87.12 87.60 89.30
Table 4.1: Percentage of saved transactions.
Table 4.1 shows the percentage of friend transactions conducted in each round
in SocialLink-B, SocialTrust and SocialLink-R. From the table, we find that all three
systems generate similar percentages of friend transactions even though SocialLink-B
has fewer total transactions and friend transactions than other two systems at the
first a few rounds. This result indicates that social network can always help reduce
a certain reputation querying cost given a number of transactions. We also see that
the percentage increases as the number of rounds increases in three systems due to
the same reasons explained in Figure 4.1b.
4.2 Preventing Malicious Behaviors
In this section, we evaluate the capability of SocialLink in preventing free-
riding and reducing the adverse influence of malicious behaviors (i.e., whitewash,
collusion and Sybil attacks).
4.2.1 Preventing Free-riding
Free-riding is a normal misbehavior in P2P file sharing systems, in which nodes
tend to reject requests when they are selected as servers but download freely from
non-friend nodes. However, in social networks, free-riders are willing to share files
with their friends in order to keep their reputation in real life. In this test, we assumed
that 10% of 5,000 nodes are free-riders in the system. If a free-rider is selected to be
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the server in a transaction, it rejects the request of the client.
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Figure 4.2: Accumulated number of rejected requests and free-riders’ downloads in
100 rounds.
Figure 4.2a presents the accumulated number of rejected transactions over the
rounds in the test. We observe that the result follows SocialLink-B < SocialLink-R
< SocialTrust. Free-riders accept requests from their friends, but reject the requests
from non-friends. Initially, connections between friend-of-friend in SocialLink-B make
some free-riders to be selected as servers, which leads to a few rejected transactions
in the first 10 rounds. As the weighted transaction network is gradually constructed,
SocialLink-B restricts free-riders to be selected as servers because transactions are
blocked for not finding a reliable path from the free-rider to the client. This is why
we see that the number of rejected transactions remains nearly constant from the
50th round. On the contrary, SocialTrust selects free-riders as servers when they have
requested files. Free-riders gain their reputation values by conducting transactions
with their friends. Therefore, free-riders have a high probability to be selected as
servers as time elapses. By combining these two methods, SocialLink-R checks the link
path between nodes in the weighted transaction network when it exists. It manages
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suspicious transactions by querying the reputation values of available servers. As a
result, some free-riders are selected as servers when they have high reputation values.
Therefore, it generates fewer rejected transactions than SocialTrust and more rejected
transactions than SocialLink-B.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the accumulated number of free-riders’ downloads through-
out the test. The results follow SocialLink-B < SocialLink-R < SocialTrust. At
first, SocialLink-B blocks most transactions between nodes because there is no link,
but still allows free-riders to download files through the friend-of-friend connections.
After the weighted transaction network is gradually built, free-riders cannot down-
load from servers without links pointing to the servers, or with links pointing to
the servers but with small download-flows. Therefore, the accumulated number of
free-riders’ downloads does not increase in the subsequent rounds in SocialLink-B.
In SocialTrust, free-riders increase their reputation values by conducting transactions
with their friends. Thus, SocialTrust is unable to prevent free-riders from download-
ing freely from non-friend nodes with the reputation management system, and the
accumulated number of free-riders’ downloads increases with the number of rounds
in SocialTrust. SocialLink-R generates a higher accumulated number of free-riders’
downloads than SocialLink-B because blocked transactions in SocialLink-B were con-
ducted based on reputation values in SocialLink-R. As the number of rounds increases,
more and more free-riders’ downloads are stopped by the weighted transaction net-
work. Therefore, the increasing speed slows down in SocialLink-R.
Figure 4.3a shows the number of rejected transactions among the total trans-
actions occurred in SocialLink-B, SocialTrust and SocialLink-R in each round. Ta-
ble 4.2 calculates the percentage of rejected transactions according to Figure 4.3a.
Let Ri denote the number of rejected transactions in round i, and Ni denote the
number of total happened transactions in round i. The percentage Pi in Table 4.2
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Figure 4.3: Number of rejected transactions and free-riders’ downloads among total
transactions in 100 rounds.
equals Ri/Ni (i = 10, 20, ..., 90, 100). Because there are only few rejected transac-
tions in SocialLink-B, it cannot be observed clearly from the figure. However, we
see the results from the table that small percentage of rejected transactions happen
in each round and it reaches 0 from the 60th round. From Figure 4.3a, we see that
SocialLink-B blocks many suspicious transactions at first so that free-riders have few
opportunities to reject transactions from non-friend nodes. Without contributing
to non-friends, free-riders only have links to their friends, which makes them less
likely to be selected as servers in transactions. SocialTrust has a larger number of
rejected transactions than SocialLink-B as shown in the figure, because some free-
riders achieve high reputation values with their friends and are selected as servers,
which have opportunities to reject transactions from non-friend nodes. From the fig-
ure and the table, we observe that the number of rejected transactions decreases in
the subsequent rounds when free-riders’ reputation values are decreased from rejected
transactions. The results from the table show that SocialTrust is not able to prevent
all rejected transactions even in the 100th round since some free-riders still have high
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reputation values and cannot be distinguished by the reputation management sys-
tem. The number of rejected transactions of SocialLink-R is between SocialLink-B
and SocialTrust as shown in the figure. This is because SocialLink-R executes sus-
picious transactions by referring to the reputation values of the servers and cannot
restrict free-riders with high reputation values. From the table, we see that when the
weighted transaction network is more completely built from the 90th round, there are
no more rejected transactions in SocialLink-R. This result indicates the effectiveness
of the weighted transaction network in preventing the free-riders.
Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 0.36 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.10 0 0 0 0 0
SocialTrust (%) 2.24 1.48 1.30 0.88 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.48 0.44
SocialLink-R (%) 0.74 0.52 0.48 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.12 0.06 0 0
Table 4.2: Percentage of rejected transactions.
Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 0.44 0.22 0.21 0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0
SocialTrust (%) 2.30 1.48 1.36 0.98 0.84 0.74 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.36
SocialLink-R (%) 1.02 0.94 0.82 0.38 0.28 0.18 0.16 0.12 0 0
Table 4.3: Percentage of free-riders’ downloads
Figure 4.3b shows the number of free-riders’ downloads among the total trans-
actions occurred in SocialLink-B, SocialTrust and SocialLink-R in each round. Ta-
ble 4.3 calculates the percentage of free-riders’ downloads according to Figure 4.3b.
We define Fi as the number of free-riders’ downloads in round i and Ni as the number
of total happened transactions in round i. The percentage of free-riders’ downloads in
Table 4.2 is calculated by Pi = Fi/Ni (i = 10, 20, ..., 90, 100). SocialLink-B prevents
most free-riders’ downloads, so the number of rejected transactions can hardly be seen
in the figure. From the table, we observe that only a small percentage of free-riders’
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downloads happen in each round and it reduces to 0 from the 50th round. That is to
say, SocialLink-B efficiently prevents free-riders from downloading file resources from
non-friend nodes with the weighted transaction network because they do not build
links when they reject transactions from non-friend nodes. Figure 4.3b also shows
that SocialLink-B blocks many transactions, leading to fewer transactions than other
two methods. SocialTrust cannot prevent all free-riders with high reputation values
from downloading files from non-friend nodes, so the number of free-riders’ transac-
tions in each round decreases slowly as shown in the figure, and hence the percentage
of free-riders’ transactions in each round also decreases as shown in the table. There
are still some free-riders with high reputation values download from non-friend nodes
in the 100th round as shown in the table. This result indicates that solely relying
on a reputation management system, the free-riders cannot be completely prevented.
Since SocialLink-R handles suspicious transactions with the reputation management
system, so it is not able to prevent free-riders’ downloads when their reputation values
are high. Then, with weighted transaction network, SocialLink-R efficiently prevents
free-riders’ downloads. Therefore, the number of free-riders’ downloads in SocialLink-
R is larger than SocialLink-B and smaller than SocialTrust as shown in the table.
4.2.2 Reducing the Adverse Effect of Malicious Behaviors
4.2.2.1 Reducing the Adverse Effect of Whitewash
In existing reputation management systems, a malicious node can create a new
account to clean bad history so that it can be selected as the server and the client
again. This behavior is known as whitewash. This experiment tests how SocialLink
reduces the damage of whitewash. Recall that we configured a P2P network with
10% bad nodes, 20% neutral nodes, 70% good nodes, and 10% bad files, 20% neutral
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files and 70% good files. In this test, the behavior of whitewash occurred once in
the 50th round. At this time, current accounts of all malicious nodes are deleted and
new ones with same node type and file ownership. The service requests from the
nodes with reputation values lower than 0 will be rejected. Bad nodes in SocialLink
do not build links to non-friend nodes without successful transactions, so when they
delete their old accounts in the 50th round, they remove their friendships with their
friends. Bad nodes in SocialTrust can have negative reputation values if they receive
all negative feedback from non-friend nodes. Hence, they remove low reputation
values and restore their reputation values to initial value 0 after the whitewash. The
number of selected bad servers is the number of transactions that take bad nodes as
servers, and the number of selected bad clients is the number of transactions in which
bad nodes are the clients.
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Figure 4.4: The damage of whitewash with 10% bad nodes in 100 rounds.
Figure 4.4a shows the accumulated number of selected bad servers when there
are 10% bad nodes in the system. The results indicate that SocialLink-B< SocialLink-
R < SocialTrust. In the first a few rounds, in SocialLink-B, most transactions happen
between friends and only few bad nodes are selected as servers for transactions among
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non-friends due to friend’s friend relationship. Due to the friend-of-friend connections,
the accumulated number of transactions that bad nodes are selected as servers slowly
increases and remains the same even bad nodes had the whitewash in the 50th round.
SocialLink-B removes all links of a node when the account of the node is deleted.
Even though bad nodes connect with their friends immediately, there is no link to
non-friend nodes because no transaction is conducted. Hence, no more bad nodes are
selected as servers after the whitewash. In SocialTrust, nodes conduct transactions
between friends at first, and then request file resources from non-friend nodes. Be-
cause reputation values of nodes are not accurate enough to identify bad nodes in
the beginning, the accumulated number of transactions that bad nodes are selected
as servers increases rapidly. After the whitewash in the 50th round, bad nodes clean
their low reputation values and are selected as servers again in the subsequent rounds.
However, 90% nodes are non-malicious in the system, which have higher reputation
values than the initial value, the accumulated number of selected bad servers still
increases slowly even after the whitewash in the 50th round. SocialLink-R conducts
suspicious transactions with reputation values, so that some bad nodes are selected
as servers when reputation values are not accurate enough. Then, with the weighted
transaction network, only a small number of bad nodes are selected as servers even
after their whitewash in the 50th round. And, after the 90th round, no more bad
nodes are selected as servers by SocialLink-R.
Figure 4.4b presents the accumulated number of selected bad clients when
10% of nodes are bad. We see that the results follow SocialLink-B < SocialLink-R <
SocialTrust in all rounds. SocialLink-B does not initialize links to connect non-friends
at first, so most transactions conduct between friends and bad nodes rarely receive
services from non-friends. Because SocialLink-B allows transactions to happen via
friend-of-friend connections, there is a slight increase in the accumulated number of
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services bad nodes receive. Also, the whitewash in the 50th round does not help bad
nodes to have opportunity to receive services from non-friends. On the contrary,
SocialTrust prevents bad nodes to receive services from non-friend nodes when their
reputation values are smaller than 0. At the beginning, most files are shared between
friends so that not many bad nodes receive services from non-friends. When files are
required from non-friends, SocialTrust is not able to stop bad nodes from receiving
services if the reputation values of bad nodes are not negative. Therefore, the accu-
mulated number of selected bad clients keeps increasing over the rounds. Especially,
when the whitewash happens in the 50th round, bad nodes restore their reputation
values and they are allowed to receive services from non-friends with restored rep-
utation values. The SocialLink-R selects some bad nodes with high reputations as
clients when suspicious transactions are conducted. However, bad nodes are not able
to receive any services with an almost completed weighted transaction network espe-
cially after the whitewash in the 50th round. Thus, SocialLink-R limits the number
of selected bad clients after the 50th round.
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Figure 4.5: The damage of whitewash with 50% bad nodes in 100 rounds.
To show each system’s capacity more obviously to reduce the adverse effect of
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the whitewash, in this test, we set the percentage of bad, neutral and good nodes in
the system to 50%, 20% and 30%, respectively. Figure 4.5a shows the accumulated
number of selected bad servers with 50% bad nodes in SocialLink-B, SocialTrust and
SocialLink-R, respectively. Even though bad nodes are more likely to be selected as
servers in transactions than Figure 4.4a since the percentage of bad nodes increases,
SocialLink-B still prevents most bad nodes to be selected as servers after the white-
wash in the 50th rounds because bad nodes do not have links with non-friend nodes
without transaction history. On the contrary, the accumulated number of selected
bad servers bursts after the whitewash in SocialTrust. Because after the whitewash,
50% nodes have reputation values equal to 0 and they have many requested file re-
sources. SocialTrust selects a server with the highest reputation value. Then, if
all available servers’ reputation values are low, then bad nodes have high probabil-
ity to be selected as servers. SocialLink-R has fewer transactions with bad servers
after the whitewash than SocialTrust because the weighted transaction network pre-
vents some suspicious transactions. However, the reputation management system,
which is applied on suspicious transactions by SocialLink-R, selects some bad nodes
as servers. Therefore, SocialLink-R generates higher number of selected bad servers
than SocialLink-B. From this test, we have a conclusion that the weighted transaction
network is effective in reducing the adverse effect of whitewash.
Figure 4.5b shows the accumulated number of selected bad clients with 50%
bad nodes in the system. We can see that SocialLink-B still prevents bad nodes to be
selected as clients after whitewash. SocialTrust cannot prevent bad nodes from receiv-
ing services from non-friend nodes when bad nodes restore their reputation values to
0, so the accumulated number of selected bad clients keeps increasing. SocialLink-R
selects more bad clients than SocialLink-B, because it estimates suspicious transac-
tions with reputation values that do not stop whitewashed nodes being selected as
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clients. Since the weighted transaction network prevents some transactions with bad
clients, so SocialLink-R selects fewer bad clients than SocialTrust.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
N
u
m
. 
o
f 
tr
a
n
s
a
c
ti
o
n
s
 
Num. of rounds 
SocialLink-R SocialLink-R (bad servers)
SocialTrust SocialTrust (bad servers)
SocialLink-B SocialLink-B (bad servers)
(a) Number of selected bad servers and total
transactions.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
N
u
m
. 
o
f 
tr
a
n
s
a
c
ti
o
n
s
 
Num. of rounds 
SocialLink-R SocialLink-R (bad clients)
SocialTrust SocialTrust (bad clients)
SocialLink-B SocialLink-B (bad clients)
(b) Number of selected bad clients and total
transactions.
Figure 4.6: Number of selected bad servers and clients after whitewash among total
transactions with 10% bad nodes in 100 rounds.
Figure 4.6a indicates the number of transactions with bad servers among
all happened transactions in each round. To show results more clearly, Table 4.4
shows the percentage of selected bad servers calculated by Pi = WSi/Ni (i =
10, 20, ..., 90, 100), where WSi denotes the number of selected bad servers and Ni
denotes the number of total happened transactions in round i. Since there are only
few transactions with bad servers happened in SocialLink-B, it is not clear to ob-
serve from the figure. From the table, we see that a small percentage of transactions
with bad servers happened in SocialLink-B and it reaches 0 from the 90th round.
SocialLink-B efficiently reduces the number of selected bad servers in each round
with the weighted transaction network. Even after the whitewash in the 50th round,
the number of selected bad servers in each round decreases gradually to 0 because
bad nodes have no links to non-friend nodes without transaction history after the
whitewash in SocialLink-B. From both the figure and the table, we see that Social-
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Trust conducts many transactions with bad servers at first, but reduces the number
in the subsequent rounds as shown in the figure when the reputation management
system reveals the different types of nodes. After the whitewash, 10% bad nodes
with reputation values equal 0 are less likely to be selected as servers because there
are servers with higher reputations, so the number of selected bad servers continue
to decrease in the subsequent rounds. The table also shows that the percentage of
selected bad servers in SocialTrust is larger than SocialLink-B because the reputation
management system is not as effective as the weighted transaction network in prevent-
ing bad servers. The figures shows that SocialLink-R selects more bad servers than
SocialLink-B, but fewer than SocialTrust. We also see that it is able to prevent bad
nodes as servers with the weighted transaction network from the 90th round in the ta-
ble. In conclusion, fewer selected bad servers in SocialLink indicates the effectiveness
of the weighted transaction network in preventing the whitewash behaviors.
Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 4.09 1.33 0.81 0.35 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.02 0 0
SocialTrust (%) 6.02 2.74 1.96 1.14 1.18 0.74 0.70 0.58 0.44 0.42
SocialLink-R (%) 4.44 2.34 0.86 0.38 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0
Table 4.4: Percentage of selected bad servers after whitewash with 10% bad nodes.
Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 4.62 1.77 1.18 1.31 0.85 0.30 0.18 0.14 0 0
SocialTrust (%) 6.92 2.22 1.70 1.58 1.42 1.34 1.08 0.86 0.46 0.24
SocialLink-R (%) 4.72 1.84 1.22 1.20 0.94 0.82 0.34 0.28 0.06 0
Table 4.5: Percentage of selected bad clients after whitewash with 10% bad nodes.
Figure 4.6b shows the number of selected bad clients among all happened
transactions with 10% bad nodes in each round. Table 4.5 shows the percentage
of selected bad clients calculated by Pi = WCi/Ni (i = 10, 20, ..., 90, 100), where
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WCi denotes the number of selected bad servers and Ni denotes the number of total
happened transactions in round i. As observed in the figure, SocialLink-B blocks
bad nodes to receive services from non-friends at first when the weighted transaction
network is not completed, but some bad nodes are selected as clients through friend-
of-friend connections. As seen in the table, the number of selected bad clients reduces
in the subsequent rounds and reaches to 0 from the 90th round in SocialLink-B with
the completed weighted transaction network. In the figure, we see that SocialTrust
allows many bad nodes to be selected as clients. This is because the reputation val-
ues of all nodes cannot reflect different types of nodes in the beginning. After the
whitewash, 10% bad nodes restore their reputation to 0, so their service requests will
not be rejected. As bad nodes only constitutes 10% of all nodes, their whitewashing
behaviors do not have great influence on the percent of selected bad clients. There-
fore, in the table, we find that the percentage of selected bad clients continues to
decrease slowly in the subsequent rounds and remains small until the 100th round.
SocialLink-R depends on the reputation values of nodes when suspicious transactions
are discovered, so the number of selected bad clients is larger than SocialLink-B and
smaller than SocialTrust as shown in the figure. Then SocialLink-R prevents all bad
nodes to receive services from the 100th round with weighted transaction network as
shown in the table. In conclusion, fewer selected bad clients in SocialLink indicates
the effectiveness of the weighted transaction network in preventing the whitewash
behaviors.
Figure 4.7a shows the number of selected bad servers in each round with 50%
bad nodes. The percentage of selected bad servers is shown in Table 4.6, which
is calculated by the same equation as in Table 4.4. From the figure, we see that
SocialLink-B, SocialTrust and SocialLink-R gradually reduce the number of selected
bad servers before the whitewash. The percentage of selected bad servers also gradu-
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Figure 4.7: Number of selected bad servers and clients after whitewash among total
transactions with 50% bad nodes in 100 rounds.
ally decreases in these methods. After the whitewash in the 50th round, SocialLink-B
and SocialLink-R efficiently reduce the percentage of selected bad servers with the
weighted transaction network as shown in the table. However, SocialTrust increases
the percentage of selected bad servers in the table because 50% of nodes are bad.
SocialTrust selects a server with the highest reputation value and bad nodes are
likely to be selected as servers with initial reputation 0. Therefore, the more per-
centage of bad nodes in the system, the more damage is produced by the whitewash.
SocialLink-B and SocialLink-R can constrain the adverse effect from the whitewash,
while SocialTrust is not effective in deterring whitewash behavior.
Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 4.27 1.43 0.83 0.45 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0 0
SocialTrust (%) 10.12 2.62 1.84 1.36 0.98 2.24 2.14 1.56 1.16 0.88
SocialLink-R (%) 6.52 1.86 1.34 0.50 0.30 0.32 0.08 0.04 0 0
Table 4.6: Percentage of selected bad servers after whitewash with 50% bad nodes.
Figure 4.7b shows the number of selected bad clients in each round with 50%
bad nodes in the system. The percentage of selected bad servers is shown in Ta-
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Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 6.80 1.57 1.35 1.35 0.79 0.36 0.16 0.24 0 0
SocialTrust (%) 10.36 3.34 1.76 1.58 1.50 3.80 2.38 1.52 1.44 0.90
SocialLink-R (%) 6.92 1.62 1.72 1.56 1.42 1.04 0.90 0.52 0.14 0
Table 4.7: Percentage of selected bad clients after whitewash with 50% bad nodes.
ble 4.7, which is calculated by the same equation as in Table 4.5. In the figure,
SocialLink-B and SocialLink-R decreases the number of selected bad clients from the
10th round to the 100th round. In the table, SocialLink-B is the fastest in reducing
the percentage in each round because SocialLink-B blocks all suspicious transactions.
SocialLink-R is slower than SocialLink-B. This is because SocialLink-R checks avail-
able servers’ reputation values in suspicious transactions and some bad nodes are
selected as servers. SocialTrust reduces the percentage of selected bad clients slowly
before the 50th round. However, the percentage increases after whitewash in the 50th
round. This is because whitewashed bad nodes with initial reputation values cannot
be distinguished by SocialTrust. As a result, the service requests from these nodes
are still served. These experimental results confirm that SocialTrust is not as effec-
tive as SocialLink in deterring the whitewash behavior, and the weighted transaction
network is effective in avoiding the whitewashed bad nodes.
4.2.2.2 Reducing the Adverse Effect of Collusion and Sybil Attacks
Collusion and Sybil attacks are common threats, in which a group of bad nodes
or a bad node with its Sybils provide positive feedback to each other to gain high
reputation values in a P2P file sharing system. In this test, we assume that all bad
nodes colluded with their colluding nodes or Sybils a long time before the 1st round
to measure the damage of these threats. With this assumption, each bad node in
SocialLink-B, SocialTrust and SocialLink-R conducts 300 transactions with randomly
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selected friends and receives all positive feedback. Even when nodes collude in the
same way in all systems, the results of collusion are different. Bad nodes in SocialLink
build links with 300 weight values with their friends, but they still have no links to non-
friend nodes since no transactions happened between non-friend nodes. As a result,
bad nodes are not likely to be selected by SocialLink-B as servers for non-friend nodes.
On the other hand, bad nodes in SocialTrust increase their reputation values to 600
by receiving 300 positive feedbacks from their friends before the 1st round. Therefore,
when the system is running, bad nodes with high reputation values are easily selected
in SocialTrust as servers by non-friend nodes. Here, because the threshold R of being
selected as clients is 0, then all bad nodes are selected as clients and they will not
be rejected by SocialTrust after receiving negative feedback with high reputation
values. Since SocialLink-R uses both weighted transaction network and reputation
management system, it builds 300 weight links and adds 600 to reputation values of
all bad nodes. We use the accumulated number of selected bad servers/clients by
non-friends to show the performance.
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Figure 4.8: The damage of collusion and Sybil attacks in 100 rounds.
Figure 4.8a shows the accumulated number of selected bad servers by non-
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friends, which indicates the accumulated number of low-QoS transactions received by
nodes. We find that the results follow SocialLink-B < SocialLink-R < SocialTrust in
all rounds. SocialLink-B only permits transactions to be occurred with friends and
friend-to-friend connections, while SocialTrust does not block transactions between
non-friends. The transactions along the friend-to-friend connections in SocialLink-B
may lead to low-QoS transactions. Thus, SocialLink-B generates transactions with
bad nodes as servers, which is fewer than SocialTrust. Then, SocialLink-B conducts
transactions between non-friend nodes via directional weighted links or friend-of-
friend connections. Bad nodes have more chances to be selected as servers at this
time because they connect with many friends through collusion. After a few rounds,
no more bad nodes are able to become servers because they do not have links with
non-friends with a completed weighted network. On the other hand, SocialTrust
selects bad nodes as servers when their reputation values are high by colluding. Only
after many transactions to correct the reputation values of all nodes, SocialTrust
can distinguish bad nodes and stops selecting them as servers. Instead of blocking
suspicious transactions, SocialLink-R uses reputation values to conduct suspicious
transactions. Since some bad nodes cannot be distinguished with high reputation
values by colluding, the accumulated number of selected bad servers in SocialLink-R
is more than SocialLink-B and less than SocialTrust. In the subsequent rounds, the
accumulated number of suspicious transactions remains the same with almost full
establishment of the weighted transaction network. As a result, the SocialLink-R
selects fewer bad nodes as servers based on the weighted transaction network.
Figure 4.8b shows the accumulated number of selected bad clients. The results
tell us that SocialLink-B prevents much more transactions with bad nodes as clients
than SocialLink-R and SocialTrust. Bad nodes have a extremely low probability to
receive services from other nodes expect their friends, because they do not build links
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to non-friend nodes with collusion with friends. Collusion in SocialLink-B only estab-
lishes connections between friends, and transactions between friends are unlimited.
SocialTrust only rejects nodes with reputation values smaller than 0, so it is not able
to stop bad nodes with high reputation values receiving from non-friends. Since bad
nodes achieve high reputation values by colluding, they easily keep their keep their
reputation values larger than 0 even after receiving negative feedback. As a result,
the accumulated number of selected bad clients increases in the subsequent rounds.
Meanwhile, when SocialLink-R uses reputation values to conduct suspicious transac-
tions, some bad nodes have chances to receive services from non-friend nodes since
their reputation values are high by colluding. However, in the subsequent rounds, the
weighted transaction network is built and few bad nodes are selected as clients even
with high reputation values.
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Figure 4.9: Number of selected bad servers and clients after collusion among total
transactions in 100 rounds.
Figure 4.9a shows the number of selected bad servers in each round after the
collusion. Table 4.8 shows the percentage of selected bad servers from Figure 4.9a
calculated by Pi = CSi/Ni (i = 10, 20, ..., 90, 100), where CSi denotes the number of
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selected bad servers in round i and Ni denotes the number of total happened trans-
actions in round i. In the figure, we see that SocialLink-B decreases the number of
selected bad servers in each round with the weighted transaction network. In the
table, we find that the percentage of the bad servers decreases over the rounds and
SocialLink-B prevents all bad servers from the 90th round. SocialTrust selects more
bad servers than SocialLink-B and also reduces the number of selected bad servers
as shown in the figure and the table. But SocialTrust is not able to prevent all se-
lected bad servers since some bad nodes have high reputation values. Hence, there
are still some transactions with bad servers in the 100th round as shown in the ta-
ble. By combining weighted transaction network and reputation management system,
SocialLink-R selects fewer bad servers than SocialTrust, but more than SocialLink-B
as shown in the figure. The percentage of selected bad servers reduces to 0 from the
100th round in SocialLink-R as shown in the table.
Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 5.87 1.28 0.96 0.35 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.02 0 0
SocialTrust (%) 7.84 2.50 1.54 1.52 1.06 0.98 0.58 0.48 0.34 0.22
SocialLink-R (%) 6.04 1.90 1.22 1.10 0.78 0.58 0.46 0.32 0.14 0
Table 4.8: Percentage of selected bad servers after collusion.
Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SocialLink-B (%) 5.11 1.77 1.60 0.82 0.79 0.44 0.18 0.14 0 0
SocialTrust (%) 7.08 2.24 2.20 2.14 2.14 2.12 2.04 1.98 1.84 1.44
SocialLink-R (%) 4.34 1.54 1.36 1.14 0.98 0.70 0.52 0.12 0.02 0
Table 4.9: Percentage of selected bad clients after collusion.
The number of selected bad clients in each round after the collusion is demon-
strated in Figure 4.9b. Table 4.9 shows the percentage of selected bad clients cal-
culated by Pi = CCi/Ni (i = 10, 20, ..., 90, 100), where CCi denotes the number of
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selected bad clients in round i and Ni denotes the number of total happened transac-
tions in round i. In the figure, the results show that the number of selected bad clients
decreases in all three systems. However, SocialLink-B has the smallest number of se-
lected bad clients in the beginning because it blocks many suspicious transactions. In
the table, SocialLink-B prevents all transactions with bad clients and reduces the per-
centage of selected bad clients to 0 from the 90th round with a completed weighted
transaction network. SocialTrust rejects nodes to be selected as clients only when
their reputation values are smaller than 0. Hence SocialTrust allows many transac-
tions with bad clients as shown in the figure because reputation values of bad nodes
are high after collusion. Even after receiving negative feedback, the reputation values
of bad nodes are hardly below 0. The number of selected bad clients decreases slowly
in SocialTrust since reputation values of some bad nodes are smaller than 0. However,
SocialTrust allows small percentage of transactions with bad clients happen in the
100th round as shown in the table because a few bad nodes still achieve high reputa-
tion values with their friends and they are not detected by SocialTrust. SocialLink-R
prevents some transactions with bad clients with the weighted transaction network
and reduces the number to 0 from the 90th round in the table. All these experimental
results indicate that the weighted transaction network is more effective in reducing
the adverse effect from the collusion and Sybil attacks.
4.3 Accuracy in Detecting Suspicious Transactions
SocialLink-B detects suspicious transactions to protect non-malicious nodes
from potentially fraudulent transactions. However, when the weighted transaction
network is not fully established, some suspicious transactions are falsely marked.
We counted the number of total suspicious transactions and the number of falsely
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marked transactions in each round. The falsely marked transactions are transactions
from non-malicious nodes with good or neutral files, so the remaining transactions are
malicious from malicious nodes with bad files that are correctly marked by SocialLink-
B. Hence, the percentage of falsely marked suspicious transactions is a method to
measure the accuracy of SocialLink-B in detection of fraudulent transactions.
Num. of rounds 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Num. of 2750 934 322 124 60 32 21 15 9 0
suspicious transactions
Num. of falsely 2511 816 207 69 16 6 3 2 1 0
marked transactions
Percentage of falsely 91.3 87.4 64.3 55.6 26.7 18.8 14.3 13.3 11.1 0
marked transactions (%)
Table 4.10: Percentage of falsely marked suspicious transactions by SocialLink-B.
From Table 4.10, we see that the number of falsely marked suspicious trans-
actions is large in the beginning, and then gradually decreases in the subsequent
rounds. This is because when a new weighted transaction network is established,
the links between nodes are not fully built due to the absence of transaction history.
Also, the paths of friend-of-friend connection may be used to select bad nodes as
servers. Hence, a high percentage of transactions are detected as suspicious and 90%
suspicious transactions are falsely marked. After directional weighted links are gener-
ated between nodes as the number of transactions increases, the number of suspicious
transactions decreases rapidly, as do the number of falsely marked transactions. In
the 100th round, the number of suspicious transactions reaches 0 since the established
weighted transaction network can reflect the overall cooperative behaviors of nodes.
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4.4 Performance in Networks With Different Scales
We configured different networks with the number of nodes ranging from 5,000
to 20,000, and the number of files ranging from 1,000 to 4,000 accordingly as shown
in Table 4.11. All nodes and files are configured as 10% bad, 20% neutral and 70%
good. The number of friends of a node, denoted as np, follows the same distribution
of the number of friends of a node from the LiveJournal trace. Each node randomly
selects np other nodes as its friends in the network in each scale. The results for the
100th round are collected after 100 rounds. We tested the performance of SocialLink-
B by the percentage of friend transactions, the percentage of malicious transactions,
the percentage of suspicious transactions, and the percentage of falsely marked trans-
actions. The percentage of friend transactions is calculated by the number of friend
transactions over the number of total transactions. The percentage of malicious trans-
actions represents the percentage of transactions that have bad nodes participating
as servers or clients or both among all happened transactions. The percentage of
suspicious transactions is the result of the number of blocked suspicious transactions
over the number of total transactions. The percentage of falsely marked percentage
illustrates how many percent of suspicious transactions are falsely marked after 100
rounds. They are all calculated by the number of completed transactions in the 100th
round.
In Table 4.11, we find that SocialLink-B’s performance is similar in networks
with different scales in terms of different percentage. Because the relationships be-
tween friends and the owners of files are randomly generated, the numbers cannot
be exactly the same. The percentage of friend transactions is high (i.e., over 80%).
SocialLink-B only generates a small percentage of malicious transactions in different
network scales. SocialLink-B maintains the percentage of malicious transactions un-
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Num. of nodes 5000 10000 15000 20000
Num. of files 1000 2000 3000 4000
Num. of requested transactions 5000 10000 15000 20000
Num. of completed transactions 5000 9999 14997 19992
Num. of blocked transactions 0 1 3 8
Percentage of friend transactions (%) 88 87 88 87
Percentage of malicious transactions (%) 0 0.33 0.34 0.35
Percentage of suspicious transactions (%) 0 0.01 0.02 0.04
Percentage of falsely marked transactions (%) 0 0 0 0
Table 4.11: Performance of SocialLink-B in networks with different scales.
der 1% in the test. Also, the percentage of suspicious transactions is very low and
the percentage of falsely marked transactions reaches 0 in a large scale network after
100 rounds. We can see that SocialLink-B saves most reputation querying cost, pre-
vents almost all malicious transactions and has high accuracy in detecting fraudulent
transactions in networks with different scales. Therefore, after the weighted trans-
action network is fully established, SocialLink-B is effective in preventing fraudulent
transactions, and it is scable to be applied on large scale P2P networks.
4.5 Summary of Performance Evaluation
This chapter presents the performance of SocialLink-B, SocialTrust and SocialLink-
R in many aspects in the simulation. According to experimental results, SocialLink-B
performs well at saving querying cost in a P2P file sharing system. Meanwhile, it re-
duces damage of misbehaviors, such as free-riding, whitewash, collision and Sybil
attacks, from malicious nodes. In spite of a great number of suspicious transac-
tions detected at the beginning period of the network due to incomplete weighted
transaction network caused by the lack of transactions, SocialLink prevent attacks
from malicious nodes as more transactions occur. As time passes, suspicious trans-
actions are reduced rapidly with a low percentage of falsely suspicious transactions.
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SocialLink-B can work on networks with different scale.
Furthermore, we discover that SocialLink-B has the best capability of prevent-
ing free-riding, reducing the damage of malicious behaviors among all three methods.
However, when a P2P file sharing system is initialized, SocialLink-B blocks many
suspicious transactions to protect non-malicious nodes. Also, a newly joined node
must rely on its friends to establish its links in the weighted transaction network
initially, which limits the transactions it can conduct with non-friends. SocialTrust
relies on social network and reputation management system. As malicious nodes may
manipulate the reputation values, SocialTrust cannot effectively handle the malicious
behaviors including whitewash, free-riding, collusion and Sybil attacks. SocialLink-R
does not block any transactions. It utilizes reputation values to handle suspicious
transactions. Therefore, more bad nodes have chances to conduct transactions that
more damage to the non-malicious nodes. SocialLink-B blocks all suspicious transac-
tions to achieve security, and the performance of SocialLink-R is between SocialLink-B
and SocialTrust. Different P2P file sharing applications can employ different methods
according to their specific requirements.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we proposed SocialLink, a social network based trust system for
P2P file sharing systems, which saves reputation querying cost, reduces free-riding,
and protects nodes from malicious behaviors (whitewash, collusion and Sybil attacks).
Since nodes in a social network usually trust each other, SocialLink allows
them to directly send and receive files with their friends without querying their trust-
worthiness. Because of similar interests and reliable file resources, the majority of files
are exchanged between friends. SocialLink builds a weighted transaction network to
guarantee the QoS of transactions between non-friends. Directional weighted links
in the weighted transaction network connect nodes according to their transaction
history, which are updated immediately after service feedback is provided. Timely
modification of the directional weighted links restrains attack edges from malicious
to non-malicious nodes. When a client requests a certain file size from a server, the
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transaction is identified as non-suspicious only when the available-flow in the path
from the server to the client and the download-flow in the path from the client to the
server are greater than the file size. In this way, SocialLink ensures that the server
has high probability to provide the requested file and the client is not a free-rider.
SocialLink is operated by a central server called “the trust center”.
Simulation experiments have been implemented to show the performance of
SocialLink in comparison with SocialTrust. Experimental results clearly demonstrate
the efficiency, accuracy and scalability of the system; reputation querying cost is
largely reduced and the weighted transaction network successfully decreases damage
from malicious nodes. In addition, SocialLink is effective in networks with different
scales.
5.2 Future Work
As a new method to ensure low-cost and secure file sharing in P2P networks,
SocialLink still has some shortcomings. First, the establishment and maintenance
of weighted transaction network consumes high resources. Thus, a future work is
to reduce the maintenance cost. Second, calculating valid paths from a server to a
client in the weighted transaction network to check suspicious transactions may take
a long time. We attempt to reduce this calculation time. Third, implementation of
the centralized trust center may cause some problems such as DoS attacks. A power-
ful malicious node can compromise the trust center and launch DoS attacks to make
the entire system mulfunction. Therefore, making SocialLink completely distributed
is another direction to improve the system. This is a formidable challenge because
the trust center not only replies to reputation queries between non-friend nodes, but
also maintains sensitive personal information (i.e., user’s ID, name, relationships with
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other users). It is quite difficult to remove the trustable centralized trust center since
participating nodes are not totally reliable for protecting information and reporting
their weighted links honestly. Fourth, our experiments show that including friend
transactions to the weighted transaction network may mislead clients to select mali-
cious nodes as servers since they still provide high-QoS files to their friends. Therefore,
we will explore a method to solve this problem.
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